Why do peace negotiations fail? : a case study of the 2012-2015 peace talks between Turkey and the PKK by Yarali, Serkan
 
 




WHY DO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL? 
A Case Study of the 2012-2015 Peace Talks  
between Turkey and the PKK 
 
par Serkan Yarali 
 
 
Département de science politique 




Mémoire présenté  
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Maîtrise 









© Serkan YARALI, 2017 
 
 




WHY DO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS FAIL? 
A Case Study of the 2012-2015 Peace Talks  
between Turkey and the PKK 
 
par Serkan Yarali 
 
 
Département de science politique 




Mémoire présenté  
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Maîtrise 














Pourquoi les négociations de paix échouent-elles ? Pour répondre à cette question, ce 
mémoire synthétise la littérature sur les théories de la négociation et l’intervention de tierces 
parties dans les conflits intra-étatiques. À l’aide de la méthode de l’étude de cas, j’applique ce 
cadre théorique au troisième cycle de négociations de paix entre la Turquie et le Parti des 
travailleurs du Kurdistan, qui s’est tenu de la fin décembre 2012 à Juillet 2015. Le modèle de 
négociation de guerre met l’accent sur les problèmes d’information asymétrique et 
engagement crédible qui mènent à l’échec de négociations. Les problèmes d’information 
asymétrique et engagement crédible sont habituellement plus aigus dans les conflits intra-
étatiques. Car il est plus difficile d’obtenir les informations sur les capacités militaires des 
groupes armés non-étatiques (GANE) et il y a généralement de grandes asymétries de pouvoir 
entre les États et les GANE. Cette étude de cas  apporte ainsi quatre contributions à la 
compréhension du sujet. Premièrement, lors d’un processus de paix, les deux parties 
impliquées peuvent consciemment faire des choix qui ne leur permettront pas d’atteindre leurs 
objectifs. Deuxièmement, ces choix résultent des mesures mal-conçues dans les pratiques de 
négociation et/ou l’absence de tierce partie qui rétablirait l’équilibre relatif de pouvoir et qui le 
maintiendrait pendant les négociations de paix. En fin de compte, cela accentue les problèmes 
d’engagement crédible. Troisièmement, les changements exogènes perturbateurs en matière 
des capacités relatives, en particulier en faveur des GANE, peuvent produire les problèmes 
d’information asymétrique. Quatrièmement, certains conflits ne se prêtent pas à l’intervention 
de tierce partie. Il peut être très difficile ou lourd de conséquence pour les tierces parties de 
rétablir l’équilibre relatif des pouvoirs. 
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Why do peace negotiations fail? Answering this question, this dissertation synthesizes 
the literature on bargaining theory and third party involvement in intrastate conflicts. Using 
qualitative case study methods, I employ this theoretical framework to the third round of the 
peace talks between Turkey and Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which was held between 
December 2012 and July 2015. Bargaining model of war highlights the problems of 
information asymmetries and credible commitment that lead to bargaining failures. 
Information asymmetries and commitment problems are usually more severe in intrastate 
conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the military 
capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and there tends to be larger power 
asymmetries between states and NSAGs. The case highlights four sets of implications. First, 
both sides in a peace process can willingly make choices that fail to achieve the ends to which 
they aspired. Second, these choices result from ill-designed measures in bargaining practices 
and/or the lack of a third party that would redress the relative balance of power and maintain it 
during the peace talks. This ultimately intensifies the problems of credible commitment. Third, 
disruptive exogenous shifts in relative capabilities, especially in favor of the NSAG, may 
produce asymmetric information problems. Fourth, some conflicts do not lend themselves to 
third-party involvement, as it may be too difficult or costly for third parties to redress the 
relative balance of power.   
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BDP: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party) 
CHP: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) 
DBP: Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi (Democratic Regions Party) 
DDDK: Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları (Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths) 
DTK: Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (Democratic Society Congress) 
DTP: Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party) 
DP: Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) 
EU: European Union 
HDP: Halkların Demokratik Partisi (Peoples’ Democratic Party) 
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PYD: Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party) 
SHP: Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic People’s Party) 
TAK:  Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons) 
TIP: Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkey Workers’ Party) 
US : United States of America 
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In the summer of 2015, the peace process between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan in Kurdish, hereinafter referred to as PKK) and Turkey 
collapsed. The resulting crisis was the third major disruption to peace talks that began in 2007: 
it had serious implications for the social cohesion between Kurdish and Turkish communities 
and caused an escalation of conflict in urban centers in eastern and southeastern Turkey. It 
also resulted in military campaigns, which took an increasing toll on civilians; leading 
thousands flee their homes (International Crisis group 2015; Amnesty International 2016).  
The armed conflict between the PKK and Turkey began in 1984 and has claimed more 
than 50,000 lives, including 5,000 civilians, and 40,000 PKK militants (Özdag 2010).1 Over   
3,000 villages and hamlets in the southeastern and eastern parts of the country have been 
destroyed; either by the Turkish security forces or by the PKK, and this has caused the internal 
displacement of over one million people2 in the early 1990s. By 2011, the war with the PKK 
had cost Turkey over 400 billion USD (Cihan News Agency 2011).3 Turkey recognized the 
                                                
1 The author relies on numbers provided by Turkey’s General Staff, Gendarmerie General Command, and 
General Directorate of Security by the virtue of the Turkish Law on the Right to Information. 
2 The number of internally displaced persons as a result of PKK-Turkey conflict is estimated to be around two 
million by the US State Department, see Turkey: Human Rights Report. 1996 (Washington, DC: US State 
Department 1996).  
3 The estimate of USD 400 billion was made by Turkey’s then Minister of Labour and Welfare, Faruk Çelik. 
However, this huge sum was contested by Mutlu (2011), who has studied the direct and indirect economic impact 






costly deadlock of the conflict and initiated a “Democratic Opening” in 2007, with covert talks 
known as the “Oslo Process,” which included the participation of the PKK’s incarcerated 
leader, Abdullah Öcalan; it collapsed in a new round of fighting that lasted until March 2013. 
In late 2012, the Turkish government reached out to Abdullah Öcalan again and started the 
third round of peace talks, commonly referred to in Turkish as the “solution process”.  
Despite occasionally grave setbacks, nine years of intermittent peace talks represented 
a turning point in an armed struggle that was based on the rejection of conciliatory strategies. 
The peace process raised hopes for prosperity and stability. Both actors seemed to benefit. The 
peace process was supported by Turkey’s important allies including the EU, the UK, and the 
US, as well as by key domestic actors, such as business associations, non-governmental 
organizations, and trade unions. 
Peace offers both domestic and foreign policy benefits for the country. Turkey was a, if 
not the, major human right violator from 1959 to 2002 among the 47 signatory states of the 
European Convention of Human rights. Most of these violations were related to the Kurdish 
question (Casier 2009). Peace may, therefore, improve the country’s prospects for 
democratization and the rule of law. Beyond its potential boon to the EU-Turkey relations, 
peace may improve Turkey’s relations with other Kurds in the Middle East, especially in Syria 
and Iraq, providing potential security and energy-related gains. The PKK-Turkey conflict 
constitutes a major obstacle to better relations with the Kurdistan Regional Government 
                                                
88.1 billion, of which USD 54.2 billion were direct, and USD 33.9 billion indirect costs.  Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to estimate the cost of fighting the PKK because the expenses of the Turkish Defence Ministry are not 
transparent. Other research on the regional effects of terrorism on Turkey’s economic growth indicates that 20% 
of PKK attacks have hit factories and state institutions in the southeastern and eastern parts of the country, and 





(KRG) in Iraq. Iraq is Turkey’s second export market after Germany, with 70% of that trade 
directed to the KRG.4 Needless to say, with its 45 billion barrel proven oil reserves, the KRG 
provides two significant opportunities: diversification of energy-poor Turkey’s energy 
resources and Turkey’s ambition to be the energy hub of the eastern Mediterranean. As the 
Syrian civil war and the advent of Islamic State pose a challenge to the entire region, without 
achieving peace, cooperation between Turkey and Kurdish groups against the jihadist threat, 
particularly from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is not possible. 
Major disruptions in earlier rounds of talks spurred fears of war and instability. Yet 
instability and uncertainty seem to have been a regular feature of the PKK-Turkey peace talks 
since they began. What causes uncertainty and instability in the peace process between Turkey 
and the PKK? Why did peace talks fail in July 2015? I investigate this puzzle in the context of 
the third round of talks between December 2012 and July 2015.   
In this research essay, I argue that an answer can be found by drawing on the literature 
on the bargaining theory of war and third-party interventions	 in intrastate conflicts. The 
bargaining model of war sees war as politics all the way down. It, therefore, views intrastate 
conflicts as disputes over scarce goods, contested borders, government composition, or the 
control of natural resources. The bargaining model also provides an approach for the efficacy 
of third-party intervention on intrastate conflicts and views it as part of the conduct of third 
parties’ foreign policy. In this respect, states and non-state armed groups use both “war and 
words as bargaining tools to help them to achieve optional allocation of goods”  (Reiter 2003, 
1). With supporting quantitative and qualitative analysis (Cunningham 2011; Salehyan 2011; 
                                                





Testerman 2012; and many others), the continuing development of the bargaining model 
(Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000; Powell 2002; Reiter 2003; Walter 2009, etc.) offers a better 
theoretical account of the protracted conflicts such as the three-decade-old conflict between 
the PKK and Turkey and the centennial Kurdish question in the broader sense. It especially 
points to overlooked factors such as disagreement over military capabilities, and many other 
differences that are insurmountable. In this vein, it offers a robust model for the termination of 
war, especially with regard to concerns about the ability to commit to an agreement to settle 
the conflict in the face of changing capabilities. The bargaining theory of war also serves a 
useful framework for some ideas about the conduct of foreign policy of third countries toward 
protracted conflicts. The bargaining theory, in this regard, examines the necessity and 
possibility of third-party intervention to terminate civil wars (Reiter 2002; Walter 2009).  
The bargaining theory of war suggests that bargaining failures in intrastate conflicts are 
particularly susceptible to asymmetric information and commitment problems. The first 
focuses on private information both sides have about their capabilities and resolve and the 
benefits they receive by withholding this information. Information problems are more acute in 
intrastate conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the 
military capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs). Commitment problems make war a 
rational strategy when adversaries are unable to credibly promise to adhere to an agreement. If 
a peace process cannot progress and goes into a deadlock, a decisive victory may be perceived 
as the most stable way to resolve a conflict. Commitment problems are more acute in intrastate 
conflicts due to the large power asymmetries between states and NSAGs (Walter 2009).  
The concept of third-party intervention is analyzed in this research essay as a 





uncertainty by monitoring compliance, redress the relative balance of power, and maintain it 
during the peace talks in order to make peace a desired outcome for both sides (Fortna 2008). 
However, a third party’s decision to intervene in a peace process is an important foreign policy 
choice. It largely depends on a third country’s ability and willingness to intervene (Starr 
2005). Thus some conflicts do not easily lend themselves to third-party intervention (Walter 
2009).  
I argue that this theoretical structure captures the outcome of the third round of PKK-
Turkey peace talks that occurred between December 2012 and July 2015. I observe a set of 
bargaining practices employed in accordance with rationalist explanations. The negotiations 
continued successfully, with a ceasefire of two-and-a-half years, largely because the 
bargaining practices employed by both actors worked as bargaining practices are intended to: 
they allowed both actors to communicate their political interests in order to reach a mutually 
acceptable agreement. However, due to Turkey’s established preference for maintaining 
control over information, the bargaining practices, which were imposed by the government, 
became a source of asymmetric information and commitment problems. Rather than signaling 
resolve, the bargaining practices employed led to the breakdown of the third round of peace 
talks. 
The breakdown of talks results from a mismatch between bargaining practices and the 
long-term interests of both sides to reach a mutually acceptable outcome. These bargaining 
practices were (1) the selection of PKK’s jailed leader Öcalan as the only interlocutor on the 
Kurdish side; (2) the lack of a legal framework for conducting peace talks; (3) the rejection of 
third-party intervention. Using evidence derived from my case study, I argue that these 





commitment problems so much as they are aimed at allowing negotiating parties to advance 
their immediate interests over a set of possible outcomes. This understanding gives meaning to 
particular practices and strategic decisions made throughout the third round of PKK-Turkey 
peace talks between December 2012 and July 2015. In the third round of peace talks, 
bargaining practices were established in a way that increased uncertainty and made the peace 
process susceptible to shifts in the relative balance of power. In this regard, I also discuss the 
extent to which a third-party intervention would have been necessary and possible for the third 
round of PKK-Turkey peace talks. A third party could have suggested a remedy for these 
shortcomings. However, some conflicts, such as the Turkey-PKK peace process, do not easily 
lend themselves to a third-party intervention. The strategic and security priorities of potential 
third parties, such as the UK and the US took precedence over the PKK-Turkey peace process. 
In particular, the US, in spite of the PKK’s repeated calls, did not act as a third party against 
Turkey’s will.  
The central concern of this study is to examine the relevance of the bargaining theory 
of war and the third-party intervention literature to explain the failure of the third round of the 
PKK-Turkey peace process. Other leading theories to explain the success/failure of peace talks 
such as Spoiler theory (Stedman 2000, 2008), ripeness theory (Zartman 1991, 2008, 2013), 
and Readiness theory (Pruitt 1997, 2005, 2006, 2007), etc. have been eliminated for all sorts of 
reason. Theories are defined as analytic simplifications of complex phenomena. Derived from 
previous experiences with similar problems, they are useful but not, necessarily, true or false. 
Certainly, each of them might have had certain explanatory purchase over a case like this. 
Instead, I have chosen to focus on bargaining theory of war because this theory establishes an 





military capabilities and the differences that are insurmountable influence decisions to fight or 
settle.  
Methodology  
This study employs a case study approach to analyze the third round of PKK-Turkey 
peace talks. By bringing together two interrelated sets of literatures, namely bargaining theory 
of war and third party involvement in intrastate conflicts, this study explores the usefulness of 
the insights derived from these theories to understand, at least partially, in the breakdown of 
the third round of Turkey-PKK peace talks between 2012 and 2015. Thus, my account is 
limited to a specific stage of the process and its conclusions are specific to that stage and may 
not apply to the entire PKK-Turkey peace process (2007-2015). 
It should also be noted that I have refrained from conducting process-tracing analysis 
because the secrecy surrounding the talks and the limited amount of first-hand information 
prevent me from conducting such thorough evidence-based analysis. Instead, I relied on 
secondary materials and journalistic accounts, with the exception of a few official documents 
and reports to support the historical reconstruction of facts.  
My research thus does not qualify as a within-case analysis, nor is its ambition to offer 
a full and well-rounded causal account. This research essay, therefore, limits itself to uncover 
in-depth insights and to understand the breakdown of the third round by reconstructing the 
processes that led to this outcome. The narrative is bounded in time and produced with 





Methods and Data Collection 
The case study method employs historical evidence structured around a relevant case. 
Accordingly, this research project is based on the method of gathering information as close as 
possible to the events that make up the phenomena, without relying on commentary or 
opinions. I use news items produced by local news agencies that were released as close as 
possible to the time the events in question occurred. I accessed these news agencies through 
web search engines. I also use government reports, official statements of state and non-state 
actors, and recent reports posted to the official websites of relevant institutions. In this 
particular case, I use a variety of Middle Eastern and International news agency services 
relevant to this project, including Anadolu Agency (a state-run news agency based in in 
Turkey); Dicle News Agency (a pro-Kurdish news agency based in Turkey); Doğan News 
Agency (a news agency with critical coverage of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, based in Turkey); Cihan News Agency (a news agency closely associated with the 
Gülen movement,5 based in Turkey); Rûdaw Media Network (a Kurdish news agency and 
media group based in Iraqi Kurdistan); Fırat News Agency (a pro-Kurdish news agency linked 
to the PKK, according to Turkey,6 and based in the Netherlands); Al Jazeera (a Qatari 
government-owned news agency based in Doha); T24 (a Turkish independent and liberal 
online newspaper founded in 2009 with the aim of offering accurate news and information on 
Turkey); and international press outlets such as the Guardian, New York Times, Euronews, 
                                                
5 For further information on the Gülen Movement, see Joshua D. Hendrick. 2013. Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics 
of Market Islam in Turkey and the World. NYU Press. 






CNN International, Vice News, among others. Besides news agencies, I also use official 
papers emanating from relevant governments (including non-recognized ones, such as the 
Kurdish autonomous region in Northern Syria / Rojava). 
Producing a case study narrative from the material available from these sources 
requires several steps. First, I use a series of searches based on generic terms related the 
project, such as “PKK”, “peace process”, “Oslo process”, “solution process”, “Öcalan”, 
“BDP”, “HDP”, “negotiations”, “peace talks”, etc., within a specific date range, from the end 
of December 2009 to July 2015, to produce a list of thousands of documents culled from their 
databases. Second, I eliminate the articles that fail to meet the criteria of strict reporting: 
editorials, commentary, and analysis. Third, I compare documents covering the same events 
from different institutions/agencies. The goal of this method is to construct a narrative that is 
as honest and neutral regarding the historical occurrences as possible.7  
In addition to this, the editorials culled from the database written by key figures of the 
Turkish government or the PKK were closely scrutinized with a view to supporting the 
narrative and analysis. Official documents relating to the peace process and issued during the 
time frame of the case at hand have also been closely scrutinized and added to the analysis.  
Structure of the Research 
The research is divided into a theoretical chapter and two empirical chapters. Chapter I 
develops a theoretical framework based on the contributions of political science literature to 
our understanding of negotiation failure in intrastate conflicts. It aims to explain the causes of 
                                                
7 In this research essay, unlike other references that are presented in text form, the data compiled for the case 





the breakdown of peace negotiations in intrastate conflicts by drawing on the bargaining 
theory of war and on theories of third party involvement in intrastate conflicts.  
Chapter II provides a brief introduction to Turkey’s Kurdish question and describes the 
historical evolution of the Kurdish National Movement by focusing on the PKK. The chapter 
also provides a chronological overview of the armed struggle between the PKK and Turkey, 
including the first two rounds of the failed peace process. Chapter III provides an analytic 
summary of the case study, namely the third round of the PKK-Turkey peace negotiations, 
between December 2012 and July 2015. And then the chapter assesses the various hypotheses 
using the data compiled for the case study. Finally, the conclusion sums up the findings and 





CHAPTER I: LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter reviews the contributions of the political science literature to our 
understanding of negotiation failure in intrastate conflicts. The existing literature comprises a 
variety of theoretical approaches that have been developed to study bargaining processes. 
These approaches can be broadly categorized under historical, material, psychological, 
cognitive, strategic and game-theoretic, and social-psychological approaches (Bercovitch 
2009). Rather than covering all of these approaches, I focus on the rationalist explanations, 
namely the bargaining theory of war and third-party interventions in intrastate conflicts. 
1. Negotiation Failures in Intrastate Conflicts 
Negotiated settlements are less frequent in intrastate than in interstate conflicts 
(Licklider 1995). With the end of Cold War, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) started to 
engage more actively in armed conflicts (Hartzell 2006). Yet there is a higher rate of 
negotiation failure in attempts to resolve civil wars. When negotiations are unable to bring 
parties together, the peace process may break down and conflicts may become more severe.8 
Taking a closer look at failed negotiations provides scholars with opportunities for 
theory-building that can be taken up in policy and practice. In most instances, negotiations are 
                                                
8 Hauge-Storholt (2001: 331) suggests that the success of negotiations depends both on reaching an agreement 
and being able to implement Though it is not the aim of this paper to address this aspect of failed peace 






not aborted because of a single misstep, but due to a series of complex conditions. In the 
following section, I summarize the contributions of the bargaining theory of war to our 
understanding of negotiation failures.  
1.1. The bargaining theory of war in the termination of intrastate conflicts 
Bargaining theory views conflict, violent or otherwise, as costly, and postulates that 
peaceful settlements give actors a higher utility than fighting does. However, wars, both 
intrastate and interstate, are very common. Why can’t conflicting parties reach a desired 
settlement, considering the great cost of fighting? (Fearon 1995; Powell 2002; Reiter 2003) 
Bargaining theory provides two explanations for bargaining failures:9 information 
asymmetries and commitment problems.10  
1.1.1. Information asymmetries 
The first set of explanations advanced by the bargaining theory of war focuses on a 
lack of information, on both sides, on their relative power (Fearon 1995). Information 
asymmetry may play an important role in intrastate conflict when both sides overestimate their 
ability to win, or underestimates their opponent’s strength. Each side’s willingness to fight, its 
resolve, is a crucial element of private information. On the basis of this private information, 
parties in conflict send out signals to maximize their benefits (Reiter 2003). They send signals 
                                                
9 Bargaining failure and negotiation failure are used interchangeably in this paper.  
10 The literature identifies a third explanation, namely indivisible shares. Indivisible shares were examined in 
Fearon’s (1995) paper on the use of bargaining theory to understand interstate conflicts, and to a lesser extent by 
some scholars who study intrastate conflicts (Zartman 2008; Goddard 2006; Toft 2002). Indivisibility problems 
might be more difficult to resolve in disputes over certain goods such as symbolically and strategically important 
territory; however, in this research, indivisibility has been folded into the discussion of credible commitment 





about their resolve, to dissuade their opponent from further escalation, and they exaggerate 
their capabilities, to convince their opponent to concede (Fearon 1994: 579-580; Reiter 2003).  
Some studies suggest that information asymmetry explains the early phases of 
intrastate conflict (Rauchhaus 2006; Walter 2006). A government may be uncertain about the 
extent to which an NSAG is willing to use violence and suffer the costs of fighting. The 
NSAG may be uncertain about the government’s actual military capabilities and resources, or 
the tactics it will likely employ. Walter (2006: 106) argues that one of the main factors leading 
to “the outbreak of violence is a government’s private information about its willingness to 
negotiate with separatists and the incentives a government has to misrepresent this information 
when numerous potential challengers exist.” In such a situation, the government has an 
incentive to exaggerate its determination to use force in order to deter escalation.  
Some research also considers information asymmetry an obstacle at later stages, 
especially in reaching a negotiated settlement. Regan and Aydin (2006) suggest that both sides 
in an intrastate conflict possess private information, and have an incentive to misrepresent 
capabilities and resolve during negotiations. In particular, NSAGs may have concerns that the 
government will renege on agreements made in the course of negotiations. In such cases, 
NSAGs are reluctant to reveal information about their capabilities that could later be used 
against them.  
There are two types of intrastate conflicts where it is particularly difficult to get 
accurate information: (1) guerilla wars, (2) multiple shifting factions (Walter 2009). In 
general, intrastate conflicts are fought as irregular warfare “characterized by small, lightly-





Because guerilla fighters are irregular military forces and can hide among civilians, it can be 
hard to identify them and obtain accurate information about their numbers. Distinguishing 
between rebels and civilians “is [an] extremely difficult political, military, and organizational 
problem even for well-equipped and well-paid modern militaries” (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 
80). Cunningham (2006) suggests that intrastate conflicts with multiple and shifting factions 
are also less likely to reveal accurate information. In this type of conflict, information 
sufficient to reach a settlement may be collected, but the information becomes “obsolete as 
new alliances are formed” (Walter 2009: 253). Yet NSAGs that have transnational links in 
other countries may have fluctuating and unpredictable power depending on regional alliances 
(Saideman 2002; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009; Salehyan 2007; Gurses 2015).  
In the absence of a decisive victory by either side, there will always be a significant 
degree of uncertainty with regard to the consequences of continued fighting. In order to arrive 
at a deal, both sides must agree on their relative power and reduce this uncertainty (Werner 
and Yuen 2005: 267-8). Nevertheless, both sides face a dilemma. On the one hand, they find it 
difficult to exchange credible information during a ceasefire and on-going negotiations. 
Uncertainty regarding each other’s military capabilities may even increase during ceasefire, 
since war is viewed as an activity that reduces this uncertainty by putting their capabilities on 
display. Although they prefer not to fight, they also want to maximize their gains during the 
negotiations and even keep the military option on the table11. This desire causes each side to 
exagerate its military capabilities and resolve in order to convince the other side to relinquish 
                                                
11 In dealing with negotiations, conflicting parties generally keep the military option on the table in the absence of 
a victory by either side. In fact, they may sometimes use ceasefire to regroup, rearm, and prepare for escalation 





or lower its expectations. The incentives to misrepresent relative power in the course of 
negotiations are great, and may produce uncertainty. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 1: During negotiations, the asymmetric information and/or uncertainty 
warring parties have about each other’s relative power increases the likelihood of 
negotiation failure. 
1.1.2. Commitment problems 
Commitment problems arise when neither side can promise to abide by a deal. Along 
with information asymmetries, commitment problems have been found to be particularly 
important in explaining negotiation failures (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006; Walter 2009). A 
government cannot credibly commit to taking steps during negotiations while sharing the 
monopoly on violence with the NSAG on its territory. On the NSAG’s side, reaching a 
settlement means that rebels must disarm. However, when NSAGs disarm, the balance of 
power shifts in favor of the government. If the NSAG believes the government has incentives 
to renege on a peace deal, they are less likely to take steps to withdraw and resign. 
Although both sides possess complete information about each other, commitment 
problems may also arise if relative capabilities shift exogenously or there are random shocks 
that affect capabilities during negotiations.  If one side is expected to relatively get stronger in 
the future, any peace deal the opponents might reach today will become obsolete tomorrow. 
The party that is growing stronger will not be able to convince the other that it will abide by 
the peace deal possible today and not demand later when it can (Stedman 2002).  
Commitment problems are particularly severe in intrastate conflicts. Walter (2009) 
posits two factors that render intrastate conflicts difficult to settle. First, given the great power 





As part of a negotiated settlement, a government may offer reform of the human rights 
situation and the political process, or a transfer of regional autonomy and power sharing with 
adversaries. However, when adversaries are weaker, they have little capability to penalize a 
government that fails to honor its promises. Moreover, states have recognized legitimacy in 
the international system, and may apply economic, political, and military means to deter 
aggression on its soil. Second, while in international armed conflict both parties retain armies 
and have capacity to return to war, in an intrastate conflict, settlements typically require the 
disarmament of non-state armed groups as part of the agreement (Walter 1997, 2009: 246). It 
makes NSAGs the more vulnerable party. Given the deep mistrust that often accompanies 
intrastate conflicts, this raises concerns with regard to the enforcement of an agreement 
resulting from a peace deal (Walter 2009: 246). Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: During negotiations, the inability of warring parties to credibly commit 
the bargain they may reach increases the likelihood of negotiation failures.  
1.2. Third-Party Intervention 
Information asymmetry and commitment problems to negotiated settlements may be 
overcome when a third party bridges the relative power gap and reduces uncertainty.12 The 
existing literature13 emphasizes the role of third party involvement (Fortna 2004; Greig and 
                                                
12 Nonetheless, some studies cast doubt on the efficiency of third-party guarantees (mediation or by force) to 
overcome commitment problems, especially if the NSAGs are fragmented (Zahar 2008). In addition, they may 
produce harmful, unintended consequences for local ownership of peace processes by warring parties, leading to 
the breakdown of peace and stability at a later stage (Zahar 2010).  
13 Along with securing guarantees from third parties, the post-conflict peacebuilding literature also focuses on 
institutional reforms to share or divide power between warring parties to overcome commitment problems in 





Regan 2008; Regan 2002; Walter 1997, 2002, 2009). In the post-Cold War era, most third-
party interventions are intended to facilitate or impose negotiated settlements, either through 
mediation or military intervention by international organizations, or by great, or regional 
powers acting on their behalf. Since 2000, the United Nations has established large 
peacekeeping operations in 9 countries, and it is currently leading sixteen peacekeeping 
operations14. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has played an active role in the 
enforcement of Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the mid-1990s.  
How do third parties make peace more likely? Scholars have identified two 
mechanisms for overcoming commitment problems: monitoring and disarmament (Walter 
1997). By monitoring the peace process, a third party reduces the uncertainty the government 
has about withdrawal and the disarmament process. In providing a guarantee of the peace deal, 
the third party agrees to intervene if the government reneges on its promises.  
 Fortna (2008) formulates a fourfold argument to explain how peacekeeping operations 
guarantee the implementation of a peace deal. They can (1) enhance incentives for parties to 
settle a peace deal by raising the costs of returning to the battlefield and increasing the benefits 
of peace (aid programs, etc.); (2) reduce uncertainty by monitoring compliance (overcoming 
information asymmetry); (3) prevent an accidental return to warfare due to information 
asymmetry; (4) prevent political abuse in relation to the peace deal. Therefore: 
                                                
14 MINURSO, Western Sahara (since 1991); MINUSCA, Central African Republic (since 2014); MINUSMA, 
Mali (2013); MINUSTAH, Haiti (since 2004); MONUSCA, D.R. Congo (since 2010); UNAMID, Darfur (since 
2010); UNDOF, Golan (since 1974); UNFICYP, Cyprus (since 1964); UNIFUL, Lebanon (since 1978); 
UNISFA, Abyei (since 2011); UNMIK, Kosovo (since 1999); UNMIL, Liberia (since 2003); UNMISS, South 
Sudan (since 2011); UNMOGIP, India and Pakistan (since 1949); UNOCI, Côte d’Ivoire (since 2004); UNTSO, 





Hypothesis 3: if there is no third party involved to redress the relative balance of 
power and reduce the uncertainty between parties in conflict, negiotiations are more 
likely to fail. 
However, a third party’s decision to intervene in a peace process is an important 
foreign policy choice. A credible third party involvement requires sufficient resources, 
leverage and credible sanctions (Walter 1997). The decision to intervene largely depends on a 
third coutnry’s ability and willingness to intervene (Starr 2005: 48). Ability refers to 
environmental and state-level factors (Corbetta 2010). Willingness refers to “the motivational 
factors that may influence a state’s interest toward a particular dispute” (Corbetta 2010: 66). In 
this regard, a third party’s security-driven interests are highlighted by the models of joining 
behavior. Rational explanations suggest that third party will intervene in a conflict when their 
expected utility is sufficiently high (Ibid). 
Walter (2009: 255) distinguishes two types of countries where it is less appealing for a 
third party to intervene: “(a) those with strong governments and large military capabilities and 
(b) more democratic countries with high standard livings.” Research on the role of the 
international community— be it external powers or international organizations— indicates 
that the greater the capabilities of the warring state, the harder it is to find third parties to 
intervene (Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Fortna (2008) argues that the 
international community is particularly hesitant to deploy preacekeeping operations in 
democratic countries with relatively high living standards. Gilligan and Stedman (2003) 
emphasize that the international community is less likely to send peacekeepers to countries 
with large government armies. To put it plainly, some conflicts do not easily lend themselves 





balance of power and reduce the uncertainty. In some conflicts, the role of third parties is 
limited or impossible.  
 Combining micro and macro-level analysis, the ability and willingness to intervene  
are considered as a function of: (1) the characteristics of a third party; (2) the external 
environment; (3) the characteristics of a dispute; (4) the characteristics of the disputants 
(Enterline 1999). Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4: The ability and/or willingness of third parties to redress the relative 
balance of power and reduce the uncertainty will affect the outcome of negotiations. 
When third parties cannot or do not want to redress the balance of power, negotiations 
are more likely to fail.  
The following chapter is an overview of the historical journey that has given rise to 
Turkey-PKK conflict including the broader Kurdish question in Turkey, the Kurdish National 











CHAPTER II: PKK-Turkey Conflict Background and 
History 
 
This chapter presents the long-standing Kurdish question in Turkey, and the low-
intensity war that has pitted Turkish security forces against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan in Kurdish, hereinafter referred to as PKK) since 1984. I explain 
the background of the Kurdish question, then focus on how the PKK has become relevant, and 
how it has made an impact on Turkish politics. 
1. Turkey’s Kurds: Demography and Geography 
After ethnic Turks, Kurds make up the largest ethnic group in Turkey, accounting for 
15-20% of the population (Bozarslan 2008).15 Until the late 1990s, half of Turkey’s Kurds 
lived in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country (hereinafter referred to as Turkey’s 
Kurdish Southeast). This area shares borders with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and contains valuable 
water resources, since the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers flow from the southeastern mountains 
and into Iraq and Syria.  
In thirteen southeastern administrative provinces, Kurds constitute a majority of the 
population, ranging from 55% to 90%;16 in 8 neighboring administrative provinces they are an 
important minority, ranging from 15% to 50% of the population (Watts 2010, XI). Half of the 
Kurds in the Middle East live in Turkey, although there is a significant number in northern 
                                                
15 Turkey stopped publishing information on ethnicity and mother tongue after the 1965 census, so the numbers 
depend on calculation methods and politically driven estimations (Watts 2010). 





Syria,17 northern Iraq (known as the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan), and Iran, as well 
as a sizable diaspora in Asia and Europe.  
Andrew (1989), in his prominent study on ethnicity in Turkey, estimates that 70% of 
the Kurdish population in Turkey are Sunni, mostly of the Shafi’i tradition (whereas most 
Sunni Turks are Hanafis); 30% belong to the Alevi (or, Alawite) sect of Islam; and a small 
number are Yezidi (Andrews 1989, 116). However, being overly reliant on such markers does 
not shed light on a heterogeneous portrait of Kurdishness that “sidesteps the complexity of 
Kurdish identity in Turkey” (Watts 2010, XII). There are people who identify as Kurds but 
don’t speak Kurdish, and vice-versa, especially in the large cities (Aktan 2012). In addition, 
the social complexity of the Kurdish question manifests itself in the distribution of the Kurdish 
population. Today, half of Turkey’s Kurdish population lives outside of the traditional Kurdish 
provinces, and Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey, hosts more Kurds than major Kurdish 
cities, such as Diyarbakir in Turkey, or Irbil in Iraqi Kurdistan (Bilgin and Sarihan 2013, viii).  
2. The Kurdish Question in Turkey 
The Kurdish question is Turkey’s most complex and painful problem, one that presents 
not only a moral dilemma, as a major source of human rights violations throughout the 
republican era (1923 – present), but also challenges the foundations of the Republic of Turkey. 
Its most pronounced manifestation is the ongoing armed conflict with the PKK that has taken 
more than 50,000 lives, including about 5,000 Turkish security forces, 5,000 civilians, and 
                                                
17 As of 2016, this area is also known as Rojava, and has had non-recognized autonomy since 2014.  “Syria Civil 





40,000 PKK militants (Özdag 2010).18 Despite massive Turkish military efforts, and 
temporary gains in coping with the PKK, the fighting has continued since 1984. But the 
problem has existed for almost two centuries. From the late 19th to the 21st century, Kurdish 
groups used various means to achieve territorial autonomy and cultural recognition from 
Ottoman centralization, and later, present-day Turkey. Over time, the Kurdish question has 
been defined and addressed by the Turkish state in different ways. When it has been viewed as 
external terrorism, the state has increased vigilance at its borders with military force; when the 
problem has been defined as one of internal terrorism, security has been raised and police 
forces deployed to identify sources of criminal activity; when the problem has been 
understood to be economic in nature, the state’s response has been to increase their attention to 
economic development in the Kurdish southeast; when the problem has appeared to lie with 
Kurdish demands that the Turkish state considered unacceptable, and could neither meet nor 
appease, the conflict has entered a state of zero-sum equilibrium (Barkey and Fuller 1997). In 
the following sections, I will discuss the evolution of the Kurdish question throughout the 
history of Turkey. 
2.1. The Ottoman Era (until 1923) 
The Ottoman Empire was based on a political and social order known as the Millet 
System, whereby a confessional community (Muslim, Christian, or Jewish) was allowed to 
rule itself under its own religious system. This system was used to organize various ethnic, 
linguistic, and tribal populations into a single politico-religious community. Kurds, like Turks, 
                                                
18 The author claims to rely on numbers acquired from Turkey’s General Staff, Gendarmerie General Command, 





were part of the Sunni Muslim nation and neither Kurdishness nor Turkishness were political 
identities. Sunni Islam ideology assumed a central role in Ottoman institutions, including the 
educational system, which was defined by Islamic jurisprudence. At the same time, the 
Ottoman elite partially recognized the ethno-religious particularities of Muslim communities, 
and defined Kurds as the gray nation (boz millet), and the Turkomen as the black nation (kara 
millet). Within Muslim communities, there were Kurdish-speaking mosques and Kurdish-run 
and independent religious schools (medreses) that advanced Kurdish literature (Bruinessen 
1998). Until the 19th century, much of the geo-cultural region of Kurdistan in the Ottoman 
Empire was under the rule of autonomous Kurdish principalities (Bozarslan 2009). 
It was only when the Ottoman Empire tried to centralize its administrative system, 
starting in the 19th century, that Kurdish tribes began to revolt; Turkishness gained political 
significance when the Ottoman Empire faced a series of nationalist uprisings, of non-Muslim 
as well as Muslim groups (Ergil 2000). This was the beginning of the Kurdish nationalist 
movements (Bozarslan 2009).  
2.2. The Early Republican Era (aka The One-Party Era, 1923 - 1943) 
Following World War I, the Ottoman government was forced to sign the Treaty of 
Sèvres, dividing the remnants of the Empire along ethnic lines, including Kurdistan and 
Armenia in the east and southeast of present-day Turkey. The occupation of present-day 
Turkey by the Greek army, as defined by the Treaty of Sèvres, triggered a popular national 
liberation movement led by Mustafa Kemal. During the war of Independence (1919-1923), 
Kemal embraced a pan-Islamic discourse and recognized the ethno-religious particularities of 





communities, especially the Kurds (Ergil 2000), who sought “to preserve the sanctity of the 
caliphate in a Turkish-Muslim Empire” (Natali 2005, 76). Neither Kurdish nor Turkish 
political groups were highly ethnicized during the transition period, and “the boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion were not based on ethnicity but on the lines between the rulers and the 
rules, which included religion” (Natali 2005, 77).  
After its victory against the Greek army, Turkey signed the Treaty of Lausanne, which 
gave rise to the Republic of Turkey. Rather than naming itself the Turkish Republic, the new 
state’s official name was the Republic of Turkey in order to refer to “the geographical region 
in which all the peoples of Turkey” lived (Ergil 2000: 124). Nevertheless, while the Treaty of 
Lausanne recognized the cultural rights of non-Muslims, it failed to mention the collective 
rights of non-Turkish Muslim communities (Yeğen 2007). In addition, soon after its 
foundation, the multicultural stance of the new ruling elite changed.19 Beginning in 1925, 
Kemal abandoned reference to the peoples of Turkey, and launched an assimilation campaign 
to reshape national identity in the newly-born republic, in an attempt to create a unified, 
secular, modern official state nationalism known as Kemalism. The army was charged with 
safeguarding the Kemalist character of the republic. Kemal centralized the Kurdish provinces 
in the southeast by appointing inspector generals tied to the military as their supreme chiefs. 
                                                
19 Kemal institutionalized Turkish-Kurdish character in the new state with the first provisional constitution of the 
national assembly on 23 April 1920. The constitution claimed that the Republic of Turkey consisted of two 
groups, Turks and Kurds. In 1922, the Turkish parliament created a draft law for proposed autonomy in 
Kurdistan. Referring to the Kurds as a nation, the law offered them the right to establish an autonomous 





Secularization policies aimed to elevate the new secular Turkish urban classes, while 
opportunities the traditional Kurdish strata had previously enjoyed disappeared.  
In response, Kurdish unrest and rebellion hit the country throughout the 1930s. The 
rebellions were eventually suppressed by the Republic, and their leaders were tried and 
executed by special tribunals called the Independence Tribunals (Barkey 1999). Kurdish 
language and cultural symbols were banned, and the region was ruled under a state of 
emergency for many years (Yeğen 2007).  
The Kemalist conception of nationalism had many inherent contradictions. On the one 
hand, the Republic of Turkey was based on the indivisible integrity, and the Turkishness, of 
the state. The existence of Kurdish people was ignored (Gurbey 1996, 13). On the other hand, 
the doors to assimilation (voluntary or perforce) were left open. To the extent that Kurds, as 
individual citizens of Turkey, did accept the “new Turkish identity,” they enjoyed the full 
rights of citizenship. Shortly after the foundation of the Republic, all Kurdish medreses were 
closed, and publication in any language other than Turkish was banned (Yeğen 2007). Starting 
in the early years of the Republic, Kurdish people were internally displaced, from Turkey’s 
Kurdish southeast to western regions where they were in the minority (Bozarslan 1997). The 
official attitudes and actions of the Turkish state were based upon the idea that Kurds were 
mountain Turks (Natali 2005; Gurbey 1996).  
The idea of Turkish nationalism was both civic and ethno-cultural in nature. Its civic 
character allowed individual Kurds to rise as Turkish citizens of Kurdish descent, but those 
who refused to accept Turkish identity and language were severely suppressed. The results 





where Kurds were in the majority), and economics (Turkey’s Kurdish southeast was 
underdeveloped and relatively poorer) (Barkey 1999). 
Kurds became non-entities in Turkish politics. All references to Kurds as a distinct 
group were dropped. For instance, in 1937, in the course of Kurdish revolts in Dersim (today 
known as Tunceli, a city in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast), news media were allowed neither to 
refer to incidents in the region nor use the words evocative of Kurds (e.g. Kurd, Kurdistan, 
Kurdish), the likes of which incrementally disappeared from the media and official documents, 
including school textbooks (Barkey and Fuller 1997, 64).  
2.3. The Multiparty Era (1946 - present) 
The suppression of the last large-scale Kurdish rebellion in 1937 and the transition to 
multiparty politics paved the way for the creation, albeit limited, of a political space for 
Kurdish politics. The Democratic Party, although it was a breakaway faction of the hard-liner 
Kemalist Republican People’s Party, promised to reduce secularist policies that were 
inherently related to the Kurdish question. They promised to change some of the oppressive 
practices in rural areas of Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, and enlisted exiled members of 
prominent Kurdish families to help them. The Democratic Party won an outright majority of 
the vote in a landslide victory in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast (Barkey 1999). 
However, as a breakaway faction of the Republican People’s Party, the Democratic 
Party was unwilling to engage in activities that might encourage Kurdish nationalist activism. 
While they made attempts to meet some Kurdish demands, such as the pursuit of General 





more. Eventually, in 1960, the Democratic Party was overthrown by the military, which was 
disturbed by its increasing distance from Kemalist republican principles.  
In the years that followed, the plotters of the 1960 coup created a liberal constitution 
that set the groundwork for the emergence of trade unions and student organizations by 
increasing freedom of expression regarding the Kurdish issue. For the first time, the Kurdish 
question found space in a left-wing party, namely the Turkey Workers’ Party (Türkiye İsçi 
Partisi, TIP), to express itself as the “Eastern Problem,” using a left-wing political terminology 
under the soviet sphere of influence. Nevertheless, the TIP was banned by the Constitutional 
Court in 1971, following another military coup. 
The 1960s were momentous for the Kurdish question. It was a period of left-wing 
activism. Seeking national rights, Kurdish activists joined the Turkish left, with the hope that 
Kurds, as inhabitants of the most underdeveloped regions of the country, would be liberated 
after an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist revolution. However, some Kurdish groups were 
frustrated with the Turkish Left’s attitude toward the Kurdish question, and ended up creating 
explicitly Kurdish left-wing organizations. The Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths 
(Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları, DDDK) was founded in 1969. It provided a training ground 
for numerous other Kurdish organizations, including the present-day Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (Barkey 1999; Bozarslan 1997).        
A military coup in 1980 marked another important turning point. The junta eradicated 
not only left-wing and right-wing opposition, but also all Kurdish organizations that were 
related to Kurdish identity formation. Turkey returned to the hardline policies of the 1930s, 





the local population. Kurdish politicians joined the political parties after the return to 
democracy, but in the late 1980s they expressed their grievances within the ranks of the left-
wing Social Democratic People’s Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP), which led to 
their expulsion, and the beginning of the pro-Kurdish parties’ era (Barkey 1999). 
By the early 1990s, the Kurdish question manifested itself more overtly than ever in 
the Turkish political scene. Kurdish refugees arriving from Iraq and the Halabja massacre 
brought the Kurdish question out into the center of Turkish politics. The refugee problem led 
Turkish Kurds to mobilize to help their kin, which contributed to their alienation as a distinct 
population. In addition, the increasing PKK insurgency gave new impetus to their growing 
national identity formation. Turkey’s Kurdish political activism wasn’t only restricted to its 
national identity crisis, but was also expanded to include the creation of human rights 
organizations, cultural associations, and political parties. The psychological gap between 
Kurds and Turks has become increasingly visible, and has been seen as a threat to national 
security and cohesion by the Turkish governments (Barkey 1999). 
In the mid-1990s, Turkish politics went through another important change. As the 
Kurdish question was internationalized, it became more visible and gave momentum to a new 
wave of Kurdish nationalism. The growing strength of ideas about identity, difference, and 
cultural and human rights, and the increasing armed struggle of the PKK, were perceived by 
the Turkish state as the anger of Turkey’s Kurds.  
Both mainstream and extreme Turkish nationalist parties quickly became very popular. 
For the extreme nationalist parties, the Kurdish question was an artificial question imposed on 





forgotten they were actually of Turkish descent. They needed to be re-Turkified. However, as 
the Kurdish question became more visible and inevitable, it became more difficult for the 
extreme nationalist parties to hold this view. As a result, they started to perceive Kurds as an 
untrustworthy people on Turkish soil, an enemy within (Yeğen 2007, 137). Mainstream 
nationalist parties were forced to recognize the distinction of Kurdish identity as well, due to 
the changing paradigm in international politics and the pressure of the Kurdish opposition. 
However, mainstream nationalism held its ground in denying recognition of the “physical 
existence of Kurds in the language of law” in the 1990s (Ibid.). 
2.4. The Kurdish Question in the 2000s  
With Öcalan’s capture in 1999, and Turkey becoming an official candidate for 
accession to the European Union (EU), the Kurdish question entered a new dimension. Until 
then, the state had made a great effort to prevent “the communalization of the conflict between 
Kurds and Turks,” and had tried to make a distinction between the PKK and the larger 
Kurdish question of cultural rights. However, as part of the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, Turkey 
was asked to reform its legal system and provide minority rights for Kurds. In addition, the 
accession process created new opportunity spaces for the PKK, which shifted its strategies 
after Öcalan’s capture. These developments brought the Kurdish question to social and 
political spheres it hadn’t reached before. At the same time, the coming to power of the Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) raised expectations for the 
resolution of the Kurdish issue. As a self-described conservative democratic party 
(Muhafazakar demokrat in Turkish), the AKP challenged Kemalist secularism and offered its 
own solution – Islam as a cement- to end the polarization of Kurds and Turks. The AKP 





its subjugation by hardliner Kemalist state institutions, namely the military and the judiciary. 
The weakening of the Kemalist elites within these institutions set the stage for the peace 
process (Ibid.) 
In the following section, I will summarize the main political parties involved in the 
peace process between the PKK and Turkey.  
2.4.1.  Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
 Over half of Turkey’s Kurds usually vote for the AKP. Erdoğan, especially, is a 
popular figure. His conservative Muslim image, his emphasis on development and investment, 
and his drive to join the European Union, make him attractive. When the AKP came into 
office in 2002, the state policy concerning the conflict with the PKK was challenged. Its 
approach moved from counterterrorism to counterinsurgency (Ünal 2016). The AKP-led 
Turkish government began to recognize the political, social, and economic aspects of the 
Kurdish conflict. They were critical of the traditional Turkish state policy, especially when it 
came to hardline secularism. Founded by former members of the political Islamist movement 
(the National Outlook Movement—Milli Görüs Hareketi), the AKP’s emphasis on democracy 
and human rights shaped their policies on Turkish secularism as well as on the Kurdish 
question (Güneş-Ayata 2003).  
As the first majority government in over a decade, the AKP pushed forward political, 
social, and economic reforms to become an official candidate for EU inclusion. These reforms 
consisted of democratization, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities. 





grievances pertained to human rights violations and the quality of democracy (Yavuz and 
Özcan 2006, Ünal 2016).  
Through initial engagement with reforms supporting cultural pluralism, with an 
emphasis on Islam as a “unifying bond between Turks and Kurds” and democracy, the AKP 
manifested itself as a party that sought to resolve the conflict with the PKK, and extend the 
minority rights of Kurds in Turkey (Yavuz and Özcan 2006, 5). They took steps toward 
“ending the state of emergency in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, eliminating the practice of 
torture and ill-treatment, extending freedom of expression and association, amending the 
broadcasting law to allow for broadcasting in ethnic languages by public and private television 
stations, and permitting the granting of Kurdish names to children” (Idem, 5). 
The AKP receives about 40 % of the vote in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, making it the 
main rival of the pro-Kurdish party.20 However, the AKP also relies on Turkish nationalistic 
votes, which constrains its efforts to settle the Kurdish conflict. Nevertheless, Achankeng 
(2015, 291) argues that two important dynamics have influenced the AKP’s decision to move 
forward with the peace process: “(1) [the] emergence of a new wave of political mobilization 
led by the PKK that has effectively used both armed struggle and peaceful protest since 2005; 
[and] (2) the AKP government’s commitment to control the field of Kurdish politics in order 
to prevent possible PKK-led instabilities that would undermine its political power, particularly 
in the context of its fierce fight with the Kemalists (hardline secularists) to control state 
power.” The increasing influence of softline politicians on policymaking, and the diminished 
                                                
20 You may see the results of previous elections on the official website of the Supreme Electoral Council of 





influence of the military establishment have had important effects on the peace process as 
well. 
2.4.2. Republican People’s Party (CHP) 
 The main opposition party promotes a traditional Turkish nationalism based on the 
founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey, as represented on its flag by six arrows: 
republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism, statism, and reformism. The CHP received 
25.98% of the total vote in June 2011, and 25.98% in June 2015.21 While the CHP appears to 
be open to democratization, it retains authoritarian tendencies from its past, and has close ties 
with the military. Yet the CHP is far from being a homogenous party. It includes a left-wing 
hawkish faction that defends a unitary and secular state, and views political Islam and Kurdish 
nationalism as threats to the very foundation of the republic. But it also includes a liberal 
faction that is open to the peace process, democratization, and the European Union. Although 
the CHP strongly opposed the peace process in the beginning, its new leader, Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu, took a softer stance, indicating dramatic changes within the party, starting from 
the 2011 elections. For instance, a Kurdish rights lawyer of Kurdish origin, (albeit not a 
supporter of the Kurdistan Liberation Movement), served as a vice-chairman of the party 
between 2010 and 2016. The peace process caused an internal struggle between the hawkish 
faction and the liberal faction that led some MPs to resign.22 
                                                
21 Idem. 
22 The peace process produced some internal debates within the CHP regarding the party’s position on the 
process. As a result, the CHP vice chairwoman Gülseren Onanç resigned from the Executive Committee and 






2.4.3. Turkish Nationalist Action Party (MHP)  
The MHP was founded in 1969. Its conservative right-wing and Turkish-Islamist 
ideology glorified the Ottoman past, underlining Turkey’s kinship with other Turkic countries 
in Central Asia. To a certain extent, the MHP embraces secular ideas, calling itself Atatürkçü, 
referring to the founding father of the Turkish republic in 1923. The MHP received 13.1% of 
the vote in the June 2011 elections, and 16.29% of the vote in the June 2015 elections. They 
focus on Turkey as a single, united nation, and view Kurds as being like other ethnicities that 
make up the nation, not recognizing their cultural and linguistic differences. It has almost no 
presence in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, due to its hostility to Kurdish grievances. It refuses to 
recognize the collective rights of the Kurdish people, and has a very hawkish stance on the 
peace process. 
2.4.4. Pro-Kurdish parties  
Starting in 1990, Turkey’s legal pro-Kurdish parties became an important actor in 
Turkish political arena. These parties, officially at least, were not Kurdish parties. Turkey’s 
political party law banned formation of parties that defended “regionalism, racism” or that 
“threatened national unity by promoting other languages and culture (Marcus 2007). However, 
the vast majority of its supporters were Kurdish, and also because their main focus was on the 
resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish grievances. They have been successively known as the 
People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP), Freedom and Democratic Party (Özgürlük 
ve Demokrasi Partisi, ÖZDEP), Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP), People’s 
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Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP), Democratic People’s Party 
(Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP), Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, 
DTP), Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP), Peoples’ Democratic 
Party (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, HDP), Democratic Regions Party (Demokratik Bölgeler 
Partisi, DBP).  
 The Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) was the first pro-Kurdish party that was not 
banned; its six predecessors were banned by the constitutional court due to close ties with the 
PKK. However, the main Kurdish political party since 2012 has been the Peoples’ Democracy 
Party (HDP) at the national level, and the Democratic Regions Party (DBP) at the municipal 
level. The HDP was founded as part of the peace process, when Öcalan called to redefine 
national identity as Türkiyeli (of Turkey) rather than “Turkish,” arguing that the latter has 
ethnic connotations, just as “Kurdish” does. Subsequently, BDP MPs joined the HDP during 
the third round of the PKK-Turkey Peace Process in April 2014.  
The HDP faces challenges from insiders and PKK hardliners, who often use violence 
to quash dissent.23 For instance, after the Mayor of Diyarbakır (a major city in Turkey’s 
Kurdish southeast), Osman Baydemir, said that armed struggle was no longer valid, Öcalan 
and the PKK lashed out, saying Baydemir didn’t have the authority to make such decisions.24 
However, the pro-Kurdish parties have unquestionable popular legitimacy in legal politics, 
since at least a third of all ethnic Kurdish votes across Turkey have consistently gone to them. 
This percentage rises to above 50% in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast (Watts 2010).  
                                                
23 For details of the PKK’s tactics to crush dissent within the Kurdistan Liberation Movement, see Aliza Marcus 
(2007). 





3. The Kurdish National Movement 
3.1. The organization 
3.1.1. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (1978-2004) 
The PKK was founded in Turkey by Abdullah Öcalan and 23 of his friends, some of 
whom were Turks, in 1978, in Lice near Diyarbakir, with the aim of establishing an 
independent Kurdish state (Marcus 2007; Cornell 2002). Because of Öcalan’s preeminence, 
the organization first called its followers “of Apo” (Apocular) – the Kurdish word for uncle, 
and the vocative form of Abdullah in Kurdish. Öcalan was the country’s only contemporary 
Kurdish leader who did not come from a prominent Kurdish family (Gunter 2009, 119), and 
most of the early members came from the lowest social classes. The PKK eventually recruited 
Kurds from all classes, and came to consist of a number of divisions that operated at various 
levels of command in Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe.  
Shortly after its foundation, Öcalan moved from Turkey to Syria, from where he led 
the PKK until his capture in 1999. Early police pressure had driven him and most of the party 
leadership to Syria and Northern Lebanon ahead of the 1980 military coup that swept extreme 
left-wing organizations, including Kurdish nationalist ones, out of Turkey. Many of the party 
members who remained in Turkey after the coup were incarcerated, but the military regime’s 
repression of Turkey’s Kurdish southeast brought new adherents to the PKK in following 
years (Kutschera 1999).  
By the 1980s, the PKK resembled a traditional communist party, with its undisputed 
leader (General secretary Abdullah Öcalan, leadership council), and central committee. The 





like the other communist parties of the era (Gunter 2009, 120). In the mid-1980s, the PKK 
created a guerilla army of some 10,000 fighters, namely the Kurdistan Peoples Liberation 
Army (Arteşên Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan, ARGK). There was also a series of subdivisions for 
women and youth. 
After Öcalan’s capture in 1999, the PKK created a presidential council of 10 senior 
members to act in his place. Öcalan’s imprisonment marked the end of the PKK’s alliance 
with Syria. They had had bases and camps in northwestern Iran and northern Iraq since the 
1980s. Starting in the early 1990s, they moved more people to their camps in the region 
controlled by Iraqi Kurdish groups.25 After Öcalan’s capture, the camps in the Qandil 
Mountains in Northern Iraq became headquarters of the PKK’s military high command,26 
although Öcalan has been able to guide the PKK and maintain his leadership position from 
prison. 
Öcalan received a death sentence in 1999, but the European Court of Human Rights 
asked Turkey to suspend the execution, and the issue was complicated by Turkey’s candidacy 
process for EU membership. In February 2002, Öcalan called for a ceasefire and pursuit of 
non-military options, and the PKK’s eighth Congress changed their name to the Kurdistan 
Freedom and Democracy Congress (Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasî ya Kurdistan, KADEK). 
                                                
25 Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) – Masud Barzanî; Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) – Jalal Talabanî.  
26 In order to eliminate the PKK camps in Northern Iraq, Turkey’s first crossborder operation was carried out as 
early as 1983, under the framework of a bilateral agreement with Iraq, allowing the armies of both countries to 
cross up to 30 kilometres in pursuit of guerrilla groups. Since the early 1990s, Turkish armed forces have 
established a military intelligence network and organized a series of major operations, including one in October 
1998 that was part its actions against Syria for Syria’s support of the PKK, and one immediately after Öcalan’s 





The name change represented their declared intention to become a legal Kurdish party seeking 
to promote cultural rights for Turkey’s Kurds. In November 2003, another congress was held 
that led to a second name change, to the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (Kongra Gelê 
Kurdistan, Kongra-Gel), in an attempt to abandon nationalistic and state-building goals. 
During this period, a number of reformist leaders, including Öcalan’s brother, Osman Öcalan, 
left the organization, together with 1500 militants. In the beginning of June 2004, the 
organization called off the cease-fire.  
The Kurdish national movement came to comprise a wide array of nebulous entities, 
ranging from armed groups to civil society organizations and legal political parties.27 
Although the PKK is a benchmark player, it continues to waver between armed struggle and 
non-violent resistance, and between grassroots democracy and centralized organizational 
practices. The Kurdish mouvance, in the broadest sense of the term as defined by Hamit 
Bozarslan, includes civil society organizations, legal pro-Kurdish political parties, local 
committees, and the PKK, to make up a genuine political corpus within Turkey and 
throughout the Middle East.  
                                                
27 The PKK has called itself the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK), Kurdistan Freedom and 
Democracy Congress (KADEK), and the People’s Congress of Kurdistan (KONGRA-GEL); currently it prefers 
the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK). Its military wing was previously the Kurdistan National Liberty 
Army (ARGK), and is now the People’s Defense Forces. The movement has newspapers, TV stations, and civil 
society organizations that have also changed their names several times. Name changes have usually occurred 
after the closure of their legal organizations, or when they needed to rebrand themselves after an ideological shift. 





3.1.2. From the PKK to the KCK (2005 – present) 
Today, the PKK is part of the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), which 
emerged from various congresses and representation from Kurdish-populated areas in Turkey, 
Iraq, Syria, and Iran, in 2005. It considers itself an alternative system to state organization, and 
is based on a constitution proclaimed in 2005.28 The KCK, therefore, refers to an umbrella 
body that integrates the whole Kurdish mouvance. The KCK consists of various armed judicial 
and legislative groups, including the PKK, and legal groups, such as pro-Kurdish parties in 
Turkey. After the foundation of the KCK, previous organizations were abolished and/or 
replaced by new institutions within the KCK system. However, the distinction between the 
PKK and the KCK remains obscure. In other words, although not everybody in the KCK is 
PKK, the PKK and the KCK are intermingled in most respects.29 The name PKK continues to 
be used by both sympathizers and opponents to refer to the new organization.30 
The KCK is a giant system of transnational ties that is meant to be an alternative to the 
nation-state paradigm. Its contract of 47 articles declares that every “Kurdistan-born citizen” 
enjoys a wide variety of rights, such as use of the mother tongue, and religious freedom within 
a “democratic, communal-federal system” organized in five regions: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
and the Kurdish Diaspora (mainly in Europe). Within Turkey, there are four regions: 
                                                
28 See the KCK Contract in Turkish on https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/KCK_S%C3%B6zle%C5%9Fmesi (2 
September 2016).  
29 Although the PKK is designated a terrorist organization by the USA and the European Union, the KCK is not 
officially listed as a terrorist organization, and neither is its Syrian Kurdish member Democratic Union Party 
(PYD). However, the PYD is officially listed as a terrorist organization in Turkey, which has become a point of 
contention between the US and Turkey. “Envoy reiterates US does not consider PYD a terror group”. Hurriyet 
Daily News. 24 June 2016.     





Çukurova (in the eastern Mediterranean part of the country), Amed (Diyarbakır, a province in 
the southeast), Serhat (Erzurum, a province in eastern Turkey), and the Aegean region 
(Western Turkey). 
The KCK has a complicated horizontal pyramid structure. In accordance with Öcalan’s 
gender-equality principle for the liberation of women, the KCK is based on a co-leadership 
system, with a woman and a man occupying each position. After the honorary president, 
Öcalan, the KCK is currently co-presided over by Cemil Bayık, a Sunni Kurdish man from 
Turkey, and Bese Hozat, a Kurdish woman of Alevi descent, also from Turkey. The KCK’s 
supreme organ is a parliament of 300 members, the Kongra-Gel. The legislative Kongra-Gel 
assembly elects a 31-person Executive Council. The Kongra-Gel works through social, 
political, ideological, fiscal, defense, and public relations committees (KCK Constitution 
2015). 
 In addition to the PKK, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a 
Kurdistanê, PJAK) is active in Iran; the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitî ya 
Demokratik, PYD) is active in northern Syria; and the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party 
(Partiya Çaresera Demokratik Kurdistan, PÇDK) is active in Northern Iraq. In each region, 
people’s assemblies, representing people living in the KCK, are organized in cities, towns, 
neighborhoods, and villages, in accordance with Article 21 of the KCK Contract. The KCK 
Contract (Article 28) establishes a judiciary consisting of a high court of justice, courts of 
people’s justice and administrative justice, and military courts (KCK Contract 2005). The 
PKK’s armed unit, the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), which is run from the Qandil 





Protection Unit, which is run from the de facto Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava— by 
Sîpan Hemo, are also included in the KCK.31  
In addition, as part of the KCK, the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) was 
established in 2007 as a civil society platform, and acted as the Kurdistan Liberation 
Movement’s de facto parliament. In 2011, during their extraordinary congress, with 850 
delegates from throughout Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, the DTK unilaterally declared 
democratic autonomy, inspired by Öcalan’s ideas.32 Although there have been several changes 
in leadership, the three top leaders of the KCK are its jailed founder, Abdullah Öcalan, the 
KCK Executive Co-chair, Cemil Bayık, and the HPG commander-in-chief, Murat Karayılan. 
Those three have decisive power in the KCK (Bilgin and Sarihan 2013). 
The extent to which the KCK system is put into effect in Turkey is ambiguous. 
Turkey’s arrest of thousands of Kurdish people for their connection to the KCK since 2009, 
however, may indicate that Turkey certainly believes that the KCK has become an important 
actor outside of the PKK’s armed struggle.  
3.2. The Ideology 
The PKK was founded with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state on 
the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology (Marcus 2007; Cornell 2002). The PKK’s founders 
were activists on the extreme left, but they were highly critical of the Turkish left’s attitude 
towards the Kurdish question, which denied the national rights of Turkey’s Kurds (Kutschera 
                                                
31 “PKK yeniden yapılanıyor [PKK is restructuring itself] ”. BBC Türkçe. 10 July 2013. See KCK Constitution in 
Turkish on https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/KCK_S%C3%B6zle%C5%9Fmesi (2 September 2016). 





1994). Soon after its creation, the PKK distinguished itself from other Kurdish organizations. 
It emphasized armed struggle, with a Marxist-Leninist ideology and centralist organizational 
patterns, more than any other organization did (Kutschera 1994, 13). They mobilized the 
peasantry, since Turkey’s Kurdish southeast had essentially no industrial working class, and 
the rural economy was controlled by traditional landlords. Accordingly, they initially targeted 
Kurdish landlords who were in cahoots with the state, such as the member of parliament from 
the right-wing Justice party whom they attempted to assassinate (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 22). 
Early police pressure drove Öcalan and most of the party leadership to flee to Syria and 
Northern Lebanon before the 1980 military coup that swept extreme left-wing organizations, 
including Kurdish nationalist ones, out of Turkey. Although many party members who stayed 
were incarcerated due to the post-1980 coup dragnet, the military regime’s repression in 
Turkey’s Kurdish southeast helped the PKK gain adherents in the following years (Kutschera 
1999).  
In 1991, the PKK removed the hammer and sickle from its flag and started to call itself 
the Kurdish Liberation Movement, and more recently, the Kurdistan Liberation Movement. 
The PKK now recognizes different minority groups living in the geo-cultural region of 
Kurdistan, which includes northern Iraq, southeastern Turkey, northern Syria, and 
northwestern Iran, and it rejects the nation-state paradigm.33  
In the mid-1990s, although certain features of “Leninist democratic centralism” 
remained within the party administration, the PKK underwent a dramatic shift in its political 
                                                






orientation and adopted a critical approach to the concept of nation-state (Barkey and Fuller 
1998, 25). The arrest of Öcalan, in 1999, was the impetus for the ideological transformation. 
The PKK’s ideological framework was reestablished on the basis of Öcalan’s official defense 
texts during his trials, and has been accepted as the official party line. Öcalan’s radical concept 
of democracy, “Democratic Confederalism,” is defined as a model for “democratic self-
government” (Öcalan 2008, 32). Democratic Confederalism, according to Öcalan (2008, 33), 
is a libertarian socialist political system based on “the self-government of local communities, 
and is organized in the form of open councils, town councils, local parliaments and larger 
congresses”. According to Democratic Confederalism, the Kurdish Liberation Movement 
should build these self-governing bodies throughout Kurdistan; thus the KCK was established 
as an alternative to the nation-state concept (Casier and Jongerden 2010).  
Despite this ideological transformation, armed struggle remains central to the 
Kurdistan Liberation Movement. The on-going war in Syria, especially, increased the role of 
its armed wings.34 
3.3. The Leadership 
Despite his capture in 1999, Öcalan is the undisputed leader of the KCK. Öcalan’s 
personality and approach to leadership had a great impact on the organization of the PKK, 
                                                
34 Although Turkey doesn’t see a difference between the KCK, the PKK, and the Syrian PYD, which is a KCK 
entity, the KCK and the PYD are not designated terrorist organizations by any other country. While the PKK is 
designated a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department and the EU, it has never been so designated by 
the UN, due to rejection by Russia and China. In addition, the PYD opened a representative in Moscow in 
February 2016 and the HDP attended its inauguration. “PYD opens office in Moscow, inauguration attended by 





making him a legendary symbol of the Kurdish National Movement (Marcus 2007). His 
sympathizers call him “Apo”, the vocative version of Abdullah and the Kurdish word for 
uncle (Cagaptay 2007). Öcalan has consciously sought this loyalty. He said in an interview 
“Everyone should take note of the way I live…The way I eat, the way I think, my orders, and 
even my inactivity should be carefully studied. There will be lessons to be learned from 
several generations because Apo is a great teacher” (Çevik 1998 in Cagaptay 2007: 46).      
Öcalan monopolized the Kurdish nationalist struggle. Not only did he refuse to tolerate 
other political or armed Kurdish groups operating in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast or the other 
parts of Kurdistan,35 he also consolidated his power within the PKK by eliminating potential 
rivals (Cagaptay 2007). He has become an object of extraordinary devotion, whose followers 
regard him with a mixture of fear and respect. Since his capture, more than 100 Kurds have set 
themselves on fire, including an 11-year-old school girl from Iranian Kurdistan, and a 56-year-
old housewife from Istanbul, who shouted, “Long live our leader, Apo” (Özcan 2006: 174). 
After Öcalan’s capture, the PKK’s military high command headquarters moved to their 
camps in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, 36 but Öcalan has been able to guide them and 
                                                
35 Despite having military bases in Northern Iraq, the PKK do not get along with other Kurdish political groups in 
Northern Iraq and Syria, especially with the president of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region in Northern Iraq, 
Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party. The PKK and the PYD have disputed over control of emerging Kurdish 
autonomous regions in Northern Syria.  
36 In order to eliminate the PKK camps in northern Iraq, Turkey’s first cross-border operation was carried out as 
early as 1983, under the framework of a bilateral agreement with Iraq allowing the army of both countries to 
cross up to 30 kilometers in pursuit of guerrilla groups. Since the early 1990s, Turkish armed forces have 
established a military intelligence network and organized a series of major operations, including one in October 
1998 against Syria due to its support for the PKK, another immediately after Öcalan’s arrest in February 1999, as 





maintain his leadership position from prison. His main channel of communication with the 
PKK was through regular meetings with his lawyers and immediate family members. 
Nevertheless, his guidance of the PKK has changed over time. In the first years of his 
imprisonment, until 2005, he was active in the practical details of the organization, thanks to 
the loyalty of a number of PKK militants. Later, his leadership of the PKK was more strategic, 
dealing with geopolitical, regional, and other large-scale challenges (Akkaya and Jongerden 
2010). 
Öcalan views himself as a key player37 in the peace process, and in fact he was the 
main negotiator during the two rounds of peace talks that took place between 2005 and 2011 
and known as the Oslo Process, as well as in the third round of the peace process, which took 
place between December 2012 and July 2015. His leadership was entirely accepted by the 
non-armed factions of the Kurdistan National Movement, as well as by the Turkish 
government.38 As for the armed units of the PKK, although they respected and carried out the 
commands Öcalan conveyed during the course of negotiations, 39 they disagreed with plans to 
disarm the organization and repeatedly sought direct involvement in the peace talks. This 
disagreement reveals the existence of competing factions within the organization that sprang 
up during Öcalan’s long imprisonment.  
                                                
37 “Muhatap Kandil değil benim [The main negotiator is not Qandils but me]”. Hürriyet. 30 September 2012.  
38 “Asıl muhatap Öcalan [the main interlocutor is Öcalan]”. Al Jazeera Turk. 23 March 2012; “Türkiye’nin 
muhatabı Öcalan [Turkey’s interlocutor is Öcalan] ”. Al Jazeera Turk. 2 January 2013;  
39 “PKK’dan Öcalan’a gönderme: PKK da muhatap! [PKK’s implicit response to Öcalan: the PKK is also an 





3.4. Competing Leadership Factions and Fragmentation 
In the early years of the PKK, Öcalan eliminated rivals and opponents when he 
asserted his control over the PKK.40 After his capture, he was still the undisputed leader, but 
no longer a physical presence in the field. In June 2004, the group’s hardline militant wing 
took power and renounced the unilateral ceasefire of the previous five years despite Öcalan’s 
call to end the military struggle (U.S. State Department 2010). Since then, power in the armed 
forces seems to be shifting to hardliner KCK leaders like Cemil Bayık, Duran Kalkan, Fehman 
Husain, Ali Haydar Kaytan, and Mustafa Karasu, who are closely associated with the armed 
units and  favor an increased armed struggle against Turkey.41 Their rhetoric is tougher than 
Öcalan’s, and their armed units engage in more violent activities against Turkish forces. In the 
aftermath of the failure of the second round of peace talks, despite positive steps from pro-
Kurdish party members to relaunch them, a KCK leader, Duran Kalkan, stated that they would 
escalate the low-level armed struggle to a large-scale civil war.42 In June 2013, Murat 
Karayılan, known as a dovish leader, was replaced by the hardliner Cemil Bayık.   
                                                
40 For instance, in the early 1980s, Duran Kalkan broke with Öcalan over the PKK’s use of violence against 
Kurdish villages, which Kalkan believed hurt the PKK’s recruitment efforts. Kalkan was allowed to return to the 
PKK only after he accepted Öcalan’s undisputed leadership. In another instance, Doctor Baran, a long time 
commander of the Kurdistan Peoples Liberation Army, was eventually executed by the PKK for pacifism. In the 
1990s, Kani Yilmaz was in charge of all PKK activities throughout Europe. He was executed by the PKK for 
failing to find sanctuary for Öcalan when he was in Europe, before his capture. (Gunter 2009).  
41 “Osman Öcalan: Ağabeyim, PKK’daki derin yapıyı tasfiye ederek, savaşı bitirmek istiyor [Osman Öcalan: My 
brother wants to end the war by eliminating the deep [pro-war] faction within the PKK]”. T24. 11 October 2012. 
42 Kurdish politician Leyla Zana’s visit to then-Prime Minister Erdoğan after the failure of the second round of 
peace talks was highly criticized by KCK Executive Committee member Duran Kalkan, who stated, “we are from 
now on in the process of a military solution…We would like to resolve the Kurdish question in line with the 






Some hardline factions that use terrorist methods in western urban areas have 
established themselves as autonomous entities within the PKK. Although they remain loyal to 
Abdullah Öcalan, and don’t claim total independence from the PKK, they prefer to use 
different names.43 The Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistan, TAK), 
which formed in 2004, is one of them. TAK has been targeting western cities and tourist 
resorts since 2006, and issues statements under its name (Marcus 2007). The TAK’s 
breakaway from the PKK became evident when the PKK denounced the TAK after its deadly 
attack in Istanbul in November 2010, calling for an end to their activities, which “don’t serve 
the liberation struggle of our people”.44 Nevertheless, while the TAK is a designated terrorist 
group according to the US State Department, the Turkish state refuses to distinguish between 
the PKK and the TAK.4546 Other independent terrorist attacks in urban areas staged by young 
Kurdish militants, like the hijacking of an Istanbul ferry in November 2011, have been neither 
rejected nor accepted by the PKK.47  
                                                
askeri çözüm vakti [one of the PKK’s hawkish leaders, Duran Kalkan : Nothing should be expected from the 
AKP. It is now the time for a military solution]. Taraf. 2 July 2012. This kind of information needs to be in-text 
as it points to one of the areas of disagreement among the various Kurdish factions. 
43 When Öcalan calls for a ceasefire, these factions, together with the PKK, respect his call and suspend their 
activities. 
44 “PKK’dan TAK’a: Eylemlerine derhal son ver [PKK to TAK: immediately end your actions]”. T24. 5 
November 2010.  
45 “U.S. labels Kurdish group as terrorist”. CNN. 11 January 2008. 
46 According to a former member of the PKK, the TAK is financially affiliated with the PKK, but remains very 
secretive and takes no orders from the PKK’s military wing, HPG. Mahmet Bozarslan. “Who is TAK and why 
did it attack Ankara?. Al Monitor. February 2016. 





Some radical Kurdish youth have established themselves as an autonomous entity in 
Turkey’s Kurdish southeast. The group calls itself the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth 
Movement YDG-H. Although it was created as a pro-PKK urban youth group in February 
2013, and was partially supported by the PKK, it established its armed branches mostly in 
urban areas throughout Turkey’s Kurdish southeast and engaged in autonomous activities. 
Pro-PKK media announced the establishment of YDG-H one month before Öcalan called for a 
ceasefire and the limited withdrawal of PKK militants from Turkish soil, which began in 
March 2014. YDG-H sought to support and defend the democratic autonomous cities and 
districts established according to Öcalan’s ideology, pledging to bar police from entering the 
self-proclaimed autonomous areas such as Cizre, Silopi, Sur, etc. in Turkey’s Kurdish 
southeast.48 
4. History of the armed conflict 
4.1. Outset of confrontation (1984-1993) 
After having eliminated other armed or non-armed Kurdish organizations in Turkey’s 
Kurdish southeast, the PKK launched its first serious military operation against the Turkish 
state in 1984.49 They subscribed to the three-stage Maoist theory of people’s war. These three 
                                                
48 Starting in the early 2010s, YDG-H militants proclaimed democratic autonomy in a number of towns in 
Turkey’s Kurdish southeast. It transformed streets into battlegrounds as violence between Turkish security forces 
and the YDG-H militia surged, an urban warfare that hadn’t occurred since the 1980s. Although YDG-H militia 
have dug explosive-laden trenches and raised barricades in an attempt to keep these proclaimed autonomous 
towns free of Turkish security forces, they asserted control only in selected neighborhoods, for a short period of 
time. “PKK Youth Fight for Autonomy in Turkey”. Vice News. 13 February 2015.   
49 In addition to the hostility the PKK aimed at other Kurdish organizations, the latter were also swept out of 





stages consist of defense (the organization of peasants and initiation of guerrilla warfare); 
strategic balance (reducing the capacity and influence of the state while building up an 
alternative government-in-waiting); and offense (regular warfare and capture of towns) 
(McDowall 2004, 422). In accordance with Maoist theory, the PKK focused on the socialist 
transformation of the conservative Kurdish population in rural areas, using coercion when 
necessary. Their main activities included propaganda for recruitment, urban activities such as 
mass riots, collecting money and information, and logistical supply, as well as liaison with 
European organizations through the Kurdish diaspora (Gunter 2009). In response, the Turkish 
government organized intensive military operations and recruited village guards—Kurds who 
worked in state-funded defense units. The number of these guards reached 16,000 by the end 
of 1989, and increased progressively in the 1990s (Kutschera 1994, 14). In the early 1990s, the 
PKK attempted to capture certain towns in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast. A number of 
simultaneous uprisings (in Kurdish Serhildan) took place, lasting three years and resulting in 
the internal displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from the rural areas.50  
Nevertheless, the PKK, in spite of some temporary gains, was eventually hampered by the 
superior manpower and weaponry of Turkish security forces.  
4.2. In the aftermath of the acknowledgment of the military defeat (1993-
1999) 
Despite the failure of their urban uprisings, and the heavy losses suffered by the PKK 
in the early 1990s, they continued to gain widespread support among Turkey’s Kurds (Gunes 
                                                
50 See Turkey: Internal displacement in brief (2013) on http://www.internal-displacement.org/europe-the-





2013: 119-123). Ünal (2016: 8) highlights two significant developments, starting in 1993, that 
were critically important to the PKK’s strategy. First, they perceived that they could no longer 
escalate the conflict and score a victory over Turkish security forces, due to the latter’s 
advantage in manpower and weaponry. Second, they began to engage in political activities, 
within and outside Turkey, a change from Öcalan’s strict opposition to making any political 
initiatives in the 1980s. 
The PKK managed to survive in the following years. There are a number of reasons for 
their ability to survive in spite of the Turkish security forces’ superiority, and their own heavy 
losses.51 First, their insurgency falls into the category of “peripheral insurgencies,” civil wars 
involving rural guerrilla bands that typically operate near the state’s borders (Fearon 2004). 
Such wars are difficult to end, because the government has trouble exerting force in these 
areas, and resistance tends to be widespread and difficult to reduce. Furthermore, Turkish 
military forces weren’t prepared for irregular warfare, and were challenged by PKK guerrilla 
tactics, especially in late 1980s (Gunter 2009). Second, the PKK enjoyed the external support 
of neighboring countries. Saideman (2002) puts particular emphasis on transnational linkages 
such as geographic proximity, porous borders, and transnational ethnic ties in intrastate 
conflicts, because they provide external sanctuaries for evading state repression (Salehyan 
2007), as well as a large pool of human and economic resources (Cederman, Girardin and 
Gleditsch 2009). Instability and hostilities in the region gave the PKK the opportunity to 
benefit from the external support of Syria and Iran and, to a lesser extent, Iraqi Kurds (Gunter 
                                                
51 The PKK-Turkey conflict killed about 35300 people since 1984 of which 21800 were PKK militants. “28 yılın 
bilançosu: 35,300 kişi terör kurbanı oldu. [The balance of 28 years: 35,300 were the victims of terrorism]”. 





2009). 52 The Assad regime aimed to use the PKK as a proxy against the Turkish state, which 
was building dams in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast in an attempt to control Syria’s limited 
water supply. The PKK moved its military camps into Syria, and Öcalan resided in Damascus 
under the protection of Syrian intelligence (Barkey and Fuller 1998, 23). In 1997, the PKK 
signed a cooperation pact with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, Barzani and Talabani, that granted it 
freedom of movement in Northern Iraq (Kirişci and Winrow 1997, 160-180).  
The PKK changed its strategy, hoping to reach its goals through other tactics, such as 
international campaigns and revolutionary terrorism (Ünal 2016, 8-9). They resorted to 
violence in areas outside Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, such as western cities in Turkey that 
were not under emergency rule.53 At the international level, a group of pro-PKK Kurdish 
intellectuals established a Kurdish parliament in exile in Europe in 1995 (Barkey and Fuller 
1998, 25-27). The Kurdish parliament in exile worked for political recognition, and launched a 
lobbying campaign in European countries to create public awareness of the Kurdish question 
                                                
52 The onset of first the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), and later, the Gulf War (1991), resulted in an unsuccessful 
Kurdish uprising in Northern Iraq, the exodus of nearly two million people from the region, the establishment of 
a no-fly zone, and eventually the establishment of the Kurdistan autonomous region in Northern Iraq. The Iraqi 
Kurdish civil war between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)—Masud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK)—Jalal Talabani, also provided a safe haven for the PKK. As a result, the PKK moved to Qandil 
mountains in Northern Iraq Gunter (2009). 
53 In 1987, the Turkish government declared a state of emergency in ten provinces in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast 
where the PKK was engaged in a fight against state authorities. The state of emergency allowed the regional 
governor to exercise comprehensive legal powers. The state of emergency was renewed in 1994; see Human 
Right Association of Turkey, Human Rights Report 1998. Non-emergency areas comprise all of Turkey, except 






in Turkey. Ünal (2016) argues that the unilateral win and heavy military action of Turkish 
security forces marked the period between 1993 and 1999.  
4.3. Capture of Öcalan and Deadlock of the Conflict (1999-2007) 
Öcalan’s capture in 1999 gave a new impetus to the PKK-Turkey conflict. Following 
the bilateral agreement between Syria and Turkey in 1998, Öcalan had to leave Syria, and was 
arrested by the Turkish Intelligence Service at Rome’s airport and incarcerated on the island of 
Imrali in northwestern Turkey. As a result of Öcalan’s call, the PKK declared unilateral 
ceasefire and started to withdraw, in an attempt to bring the armed struggle to an end. 
However, instead of initiating negotiations, the Turkish government declared victory over the 
PKK and attacked the PKK militants during their withdrawal from the Turkish soil. After 
Öcalan’s capture, the PKK’s camps in the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq became the 
headquarters of the PKK’s military high command, although Öcalan maintains his leadership 
position from prison. During this period, Öcalan’s main channel of communication with the 
PKK was through regular meetings with his lawyers and immediate family members.  
The PKK ended its longest ceasefire in June 2004, due to a leadership change in the 
military wing. It began to make terrorist attacks in large cities in Turkey, with targets that 
included civilians, local government officials, and teachers, etc., with the goal of undermining 
the state’s authority and its institutions in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast (Ünal 2016). 






4.4. Earlier Failed Peace Process (2007-2011) 
The PKK’s violent campaign continued until secret peace talks were initiated in 2007 
and they declared a ceasefire. Top-level Turkish Intelligence Agency officials agreed on the 
framework of a road map with Öcalan, and then began a series of secret talks, known as the 
Oslo Process, with a PKK delegation comprised of the European wing and military wing in 
Qandils, and an undisclosed third party, possibly officials from the United Kingdom or from 
the Norwegian Peace Research Institute (Ünal 2016). The content of the talks was not made 
public, except for some leaked audio recordings that revealed that both sides agreed on a 
stalemate, and had strong intentions to resolve the conflict.54  
The Turkish government initiated the Kurdish opening (known as the Democratic 
Opening or the Oslo Process) and made it public in 2009. However, in the same year, the AKP 
faced opposition from the other parties in parliament and the military establishment. The 
opposition parties accused the AKP of granting legitimacy to the PKK.55 The Turkish army 
renounced the AKP’s initiative with an official statement posted on its website (Ünal 2016). 
Moreover, Kurdish activists and politicians, including elected mayors, started to be prosecuted 
as alleged members of the KCK under the country’s anti-terror law.56 In addition, the AKP 
lost a great deal of public support after the Habur events. As an early act of the Democratic 
                                                
54 “AKP-PKK Oslo Talks Audio Recording (2007-2011)”. On https://vimeo.com/87901376 (2 August 2016). 
55 The Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chief Treasurer stated, “The debates on the Kurdish opening is made in 
a way that gives legitimacy to the PKK. The fight against terrorism is not carried out by giving terrorists a pat on 
the back”. “Açılım tartışmaları PKK’yi meşrulaştırıyor [Debates on the opening give legitimacy to the PKK]”. 
Milliyet. 18 October 2009.   
56 “30 ayda KCK’den 7748 gözaltı, 3895 tutuklama [In 30 months, 7748 held in custody, 3895 arrested from the 





opening, the AKP and the PKK had negotiated the return of 34 Kurds, as the first step toward 
the PKK’s disarmament. However, the way it was carried out prompted a negative reaction. 
On 18 October 2009, 34 PKK members in guerilla uniforms arrived at Turkey’s Habur border. 
The Kurdish Movement’s legal party, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), organized rallies 
throughout Turkey, calling the 34 PKK members peace ambassadors, and chanting slogans in 
favor of Öcalan.57 It provoked a great deal of disturbance in the Turkish public. The AKP 
government, who thought they had agreed that the returnees would go quietly to their villages, 
felt betrayed. They accused the DTP and the PKK of spoiling the peace process. Shortly after, 
in December 2009, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) was banned by Turkey’s 
constitutional court for its alleged links to the PKK.58  
In the following months, KCK operations gained momentum and resulted in the arrests 
of multiple prominent Kurdish intellectuals, mayors, and political figures. The PKK declared 
another ceasefire in August 2010. The secret Oslo Talks with the PKK Delegation continued 
until June 2011, when the Oslo Peace Process ended in failure.59 Both sides were using force 
once again, with attacks increasing in the lead-up to the June 2011 elections.60  
The 12 June 2011 elections were initially hailed as a new opportunity for the peace 
process. The AKP retained power with a parliamentary majority winning 49.9% of the vote. It 
                                                
57 “PKK fighters in peace initiative”. Al Jazeera. 10 October 2009. 
58 “Turkish top court bans pro-Kurdish party”. BBC. 11 December 2009. 
59 “Oslo Süreci neden tıkandı? [Why is the Oslo process jammed?]”. BBC Türkçe. 24 September 2014. 
60 The PKK attacked the PM Erdogan’s election bus on 4 May, missing the PM, who was traveling by helicopter, 
but killed a police officer. The PKK also kidnapped two soldiers and a health officer on 9 July at a roadblock. 
“Kurds blamed for attack on Turkish PM Erdogan’s election bus”. The National. 6 May 2011. “PKK asker 





campaigned promising to solve the Kurdish question through democratization and 
constitutional amendments. The main opposition, the Republican People’s Party, softened its 
tone on Kurdish issue, and embraced a pro-peace process program.61 A record number of 36 
Kurdish lawmakers were elected from the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), of whom 6 
were in prison due to KCK operations.62 They were released when the third round of the peace 
process started in December 2012.  









                                                
61 In 2011, the CHP declared 8 articles to address the Kurdish question. “CHP’den 8 maddelik çözüm tartışılacak 
[The CHP’s 8 articles for the resolution would be discussed]”. Yesil Gazete. 24 October 2011.   





CHAPTER III: The third round of PKK-Turkey  
Peace Talks 
 
1. Descriptive Analysis 
Although regional developments put great strains on Turkey’s ability to deal with the 
Kurdish question and its peace efforts, a third round of talks, from December 2012 to July 
2015, between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) 
presented the best possible option for reaching a peace deal. Both sides were convinced that 
armed conflict was not conducive to victory. As well, the rise of the Islamic State (IS) 
presented a destabilizing threat to Turkey and posed a serious challenge to the PKK, which has 
become a major force on the front lines, fighting against the IS in both Syria and Iraq. 
Nevertheless, talks between the state and the PKK were not unprecedented. The PKK’s 
imprisoned founder and leader, Öcalan, had direct contact with military officials from his 
capture, in 1999, until 2006. During that time, however, no progress toward peace was 
reported. From 2007 onwards, top-level state officials from the National Intelligence Agency 
(Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) had face-to-face contact with Öcalan. Having agreed on the 
framework of a roadmap with Öcalan, they embarked on covert talks, also known as the Oslo 
process, with a PKK delegation, comprised of the party’s European wing, its military wing, 
and an undisclosed third party (Ünal 2016). 63  
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As a result, in 2009, a series of reforms, also known as the Democratic opening or the 
Kurdish opening, was initiated by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma 
Partisi, AKP).64 Top-level state officials, including cabinet members and the president, began 
to speak openly of the Kurdish question, breaking longstanding taboos in the Turkish political 
arena. In addition to the reforms carried out by the AKP, as steps toward meeting EU 
membership criteria— including banning capital punishment, and allowing the limited use of 
the Kurdish language on radio and television channels— in 2009, the government established 
a Kurdish-language state TV channel, and permitted private institutions to teach the Kurdish 
language.    
These reforms were an integral part of the Oslo process, and their progress was 
affected by the state of the peace talks. Talks were not made public and they excluded some 
key actors, such as civil society organizations and opposition parties. The first round 
eventually collapsed due to a lack of trust, unity of purpose, and comprehensive intention to 
reach a peace deal. In particular, the Kurdish National Movement perceived the AKP 
government as disingenuous following the 2009 arrest of thousands of Kurdish individuals, 
including elected representatives and intellectuals, accused of connection with the movement’s 
umbrella body, the Kurdistan Communities Union (Koma Civakên Kurdistan, KCK).65 And, 
when PKK militants in guerilla uniforms were welcomed home by thousands of people as the 
                                                
64 The initiative was later officially called the National Unity and Brotherhood Project.  
65 The division between the KCK and the PKK is not always clear, and the terms are often used interchangeably. 
According to the KCK Convention, as explained in Chapter II, today the PKK is part of the KCK. This paper 





heroic veterans of a victorious war, the resulting exacerbated nationalistic feelings in Turkey 
caused the government to backtrack on further plans for the peace process.66  
The AKP’s inaction, and its repeated postponement in making decisions about 
Öcalan’s protocol for the peace process that included the establishment of a peace council, a 
truth commission, a democratic constitution, and the recognition of the collective rights of 
Kurds kindled resentment on the Kurdish side (Achankeng 2015).67  The second round of talks 
collapsed shortly before the parliamentary elections on 12 June, 2011. Armed conflict 
resumed, on 14 July, when PKK militants killed 13 Turkish soldiers.68  
The main goal of this chapter is to focus theoretically and substantively on the process 
leading to the breakdown of peace negotiations. Theoretically, it allows us to test the 
hypotheses on negotiation failures formulated in the first chapter. Substantively, the aim is to 
demonstrate that the conduct of the peace process was as significant as its content. Because the 
first two rounds of Turkey-PKK peace talks were not made public, and involved few actors, 
there is not enough accessible information to analyze. Thus, they are not included in the case 
                                                
66 As part of their confidence-building efforts, the two sides agreed that the PKK militants would return home 
from their bases in northern Iraq. The intention was for the PKK militants to surrender to the state as a sign of 
hope for the peace process, but the prosecutor who came to the Habur border between Iraq and Turkey released 
them immediately. Then, the PKK overplayed its hand, organizing widespread celebrations for the militants, who 
were dressed in guerilla uniform. As a result of the Habur celebrations, the government came under heavy 
criticism from hardline Turkish nationalists. The peace process failed. In June 2010, the returnees were charged 
and convicted of terrorist propaganda and committing crime on behalf of a terrorist organization. “PKK fighters 
in peace initiative”. Al Jazeera. 10 October 2009. “Retrial request for Habur convicts” Hürriyet Daily News. 14 
December 2012 
67 The Öcalan’s protocol on steps to be taken for the peace process became public through his lawyers 
(Achankeng 2015).   





study. The case is temporally bounded by the initiation of consecutive meetings between State 
officials and the Kurdish National Movement, including the PKK jailed leader, Öcalan, PKK 
representatives from the Qandil headquarters in northern Iraq, and BDP/HDP members of 
parliament.  
1.1. Onset of the third round of peace talks 
At the end of December 2012, the peace process was renewed, as Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan announced on television that state officials had been conducting talks with 
Öcalan, to settle the dispute between the PKK and the state.69 It was the beginning of the third 
round of talks, also known as the Solution process or İmralı process (named after the island 
where Öcalan has been imprisoned since 1999).  
The talks were reopened as the result of a 68-day hunger strike mounted by Kurdish 
prisoners in the fall of 2012 in response to recurring violence between Turkish security forces 
and the PKK. In fact, despite the failure of previous efforts, both sides had kept the lines of 
communication open. Prior to the commencement of the third round, two factors can be said to 
have contributed to the State’s willingness to resume peace talks with Öcalan. First, had any of 
the hunger strikers died, Erdoğan’s credibility would have been cast into doubt; second, 
Öcalan’s ability to convince the hunger strikers to end their strike assured the government that 
                                                
69 In a bid to institutionalize the process and reduce the political risks (chasing Turkish nationalist votes as well as 
Kurdish votes), the AKP government only partially owned the peace process and presented it as a state project. 
On the government side, the peace talks were conducted by National Intelligence Agency (MIT) officials. The 
major political opposition, including the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Action Party 





any deal reached with him would be respected by other elements of the Kurdish National 
Movement (KNM) (Democratic Progress Institute 2013: 17).     
The government’s commitment was limited and conditional, as suggested by these 
words of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s: “If we see the light, we will continue to take steps, but if 
there is no light, we will not”.70 The Kurdish side, on the other hand, displayed a strong 
commitment to the renewal of peace talks, and welcomed its public announcement. With the 
third round of talks, for the first time, members of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy 
Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP) visited Öcalan at the prison island İmralı, as well as 
the PKK’s main military base in Qandil in northern Iraq, and the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe.  
1.2. New and Revitalized Initiatives Take off 
As in previous peace talks, Öcalan was given a key role for the Kurdish side in the 
third round: the government unofficially acknowledged him as a chief negotiator on behalf of 
the Kurdish National Movement. But now, for the first time, the government gave members of 
the pro-Kurdish BDP/HDP permission to talk to him. 71 The government also changed the way 
it portrayed him. In contrast to the evil figure, labeled “baby killer,” in the Turkish media in 
the past, now he began to be seen as a benign paternal figure.72  
                                                
70 (Işık olduğu sürece devam ederiz. Baktık olmuyor bırakırız, translation is mine) “Başbakan: Apo ile 
görüşüyoruz [Prime Minister: We have been conducting talks with Apo]”. Haber3. 29 December 2012.  
71 Later merged into a new pro-Kurdish party, namely the Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi, HDP) 
72 Beginning in 2013, new photos of Öcalan were leaked through social media in which he appears sitting in a 
meeting with the Kurdish delegation on the prison island Imrali. Subsequently, other photos of Öcalan were 






In fact, Öcalan’s role in the peace process proved to be a vital one. At the Newroz 
celebrations (Kurdish New Year) in Diyarbakır, on 21 March, 2013, a letter he had written, 
calling for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of PKK armed units from Turkey, was 
read aloud. In the letter, Öcalan said: “Those who cannot understand the spirit of the times are 
bound for the rubbish bin of history”.73 Following this call, the PKK declared a ceasefire, on 
23 March, 2013; it began to withdraw its armed elements from within Turkish borders in May 
2013.  
However, given its experience in 1999, when hundreds of PKK militants were killed 
by Turkish security forces during the withdrawal that followed Öcalan’s capture, the PKK 
approached the process cautiously. A senior commander, Bahoz Erdal, criticized Öcalan for 
the losses incurred in previous withdrawals, and drew a distinction between laying down arms 
and disarmament: “we lay down arms today, but it doesn’t mean disarming ourselves”.74 
The withdrawal process was carried out without a formal monitoring mechanism. 
Without such a mechanism to provide reliable information, both sides fell prey to suspicion, 
and mutual accusations were made throughout Summer 2013. The Turkish armed forces 
increased their numbers in the region.75 The PKK accused the government of constructing new 
military outposts and dams along the routes they traditionally used to withdraw into northern 
                                                
Öcalan’ın yeni fotoğrafları yayınlandı [The new photos of Abdullah Öcalan were released]” Radikal. 16 January 
2014. “Öcalan’dan yeni fotoğraf [The new photo of Öcalan]” Hürriyet. 16 January 2014. 
73 SETA Foundation, Timeline: Reconciliation Process. 
74 “Bahoz Erdal: Bugün silahı bir kenara koyuyoruz, ama bu silahı bırakmak demek değil [Bahoz Erdal: we lay 
down arms, today but it doesn’t mean disarming ourselves]”. T24. 14 May 2014. 





Iraq in the fall and enter Turkey in the spring.76  The government, for its part, claimed that the 
PKK was not withdrawing quickly enough.77 Eventually, in protest against the government’s 
inaction, on 9 September, 2013, the PKK suspended its withdrawal, yet maintained the 
ceasefire. 78 
1.3. (In)Action plan for the road map towards peace 
An initial roadmap, agreed upon by both sides, was divided into three stages: (1) 
ceasefire, and withdrawal of the PKK from Turkish soil, (2) democratization, and (3) 
disarmament of the PKK, and normalization.79 However, there was disagreement about the 
timing of the first and second steps; specifically, whether each stage should be completed 
before beginning the next, or whether confidence in one another’s intentions was sufficient to 
move the process along. Following the reading of Öcalan’s letter, the government called for 
the PKK to withdraw all its armed units from Turkey, and to leave its weapons behind. 
Turkey’s security bureaucracy supported this call.80 The government would then take steps 
toward democratization.81 However, the PKK expected the government to create a legal 
framework for negotiations, as well as constitutional reforms in regard to the Kurdish 
                                                
76 While the AKP announced that the construction of dams and military outposts had nothing to do with the peace 
process, the PKK viewed Turkey’s move as a strategy to undermine the PKK’s capacity in Turkey’s Kurdish 
southeast. “Karakol yapımı devam ediyor [The construction of military posts continues]”. AK Parti Haberler. 13 
July 2013. “Kalekol’un ardından bu da baraj tezgahı” [“After police stations, now dams are part of a ploy”], 
Türkiye, 4 July 2013.  “Kurdish rebels say Turkish army is endangering peaceful pullout”. Reuters. 7 May 2013. 
77 “Erdoğan says PKK did not fulfill promises concerning withdrawal”. Today’s Zaman. 16 August 2013. 
78 “PKK çekilmeyi durdurdu. [PKK ended withdrawal]”. BBC Türkçe. 1 August 2016.  
79 “Bakan Ergin’den Öcalan açiklamasi [Statement about Öcalan from Minister Ergin]”. Sabah. 29 March 2013.  
80 “Bila: Türkiye’deki 1500 PKK’lıdan 800’ü sınır dışına çekilmeli [Bila: Out of 1500 PKK militants, 800 should 






question, simultaneously with their steps, which included the release of eight Turkish 
hostages, ceasefire, and withdrawal of its armed units (International Crisis Group 2014).82 
Before the PKK’s withdrawal, the government had taken two important steps.  It had 
established a committee of wise people, to promote civil society participation in the peace 
process.83 And second, in a bid to formalize it, it had created a commission in parliament - 
officially named the Solution process (in Turkish, Çözüm süreci, referring to the third round of 
peace talks). Public support for the process was high; in May 2013, a survey showed that it 
had reached 81.3%.84  
After the PKK suspended the withdrawal of its armed units, and to keep the peace 
process rolling forward, the government, passed a series of reforms addressing Kurdish 
grievances. The government “legalized education in mother languages in private schools; 
removed the national pledge of allegiance, which Kurds felt was discriminatory; gave 
financial aid to political parties that received at least 3% of the national vote (such as the pro-
Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party / Peoples’ Democratic Party, BDP / HDP); lifted the ban 
on election propaganda in languages other than Turkish; allowed reinstatement of (mostly 
Kurdish) names for villages and towns; and formalized the possibility of two co-chairs for 
                                                
82 “Kronoloji: 2013 Nevruz’undan bugüne [Chronology: From 2013 Newroz till the present]”. Al Jazeera Türk. 
19 March 2014. 
83 The wise people committee is comprised of 63 intellectuals, including 12 women. Among them, there are 
prominent figures, such as authors, artists, academics, and opinion leaders. Divided into nine subgroups in seven 
different geographic regions across Turkey, the government-appointed wise people committee served to 
normalize the peace process through meetings with the public. The committee reported to Prime Minister 
Erdoğan. “Wise men committee members announced”. Anadolu Agency. 3 April 2015. 
84 “KONDA’nın son anketi: Çözüm sürecine destek yüzde 81.3’e ulaştı [KONDA’s last survey results: the 





political parties (a practice based on gender equality,  until then carried out only by pro-
Kurdish parties)” (International Crisis Group 2014). 
Nevertheless, the Kurdish National Movement was dissatisfied. The BDP/HDP leader, 
Demirtaş, discussed the disappointment felt by many Kurds with the contents of the 
democratization package, particularly because it came in a unilateral move by the 
government.85 In addition, the government had failed to form a truth commission, as Öcalan 
had requested, and took no steps toward doing so. Both the BDP/HDP and the PKK expressed 
the need to transform the talks with Öcalan into institutionalized negotiations.86  The PKK 
came to believe that the AKP’s democratization package was motivated by a desire to win 
another election, rather than recognition of the collective rights of the Kurdish people. 87 The 
PKK leader, Cemil Bayık, warned the government of a return of the withdrawn PKK units. 88  
However, the peace process gained new momentum following the AKP’s victory in 
local elections in March 2014. The AKP government passed a bill granting Turkey’s National 
Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) the authority to meet and negotiate 
with terrorist organizations.89 Further, it amended the law on pre-trial detention, reducing its 
duration from 10 to 5 years. This paved the way for the release of Kurdish activists and elected 
                                                
85 “Time running out for Turkey-PKK peace process”. Al-Monitor. 4 November 2013.  
86 Ibid.  
87 “KCK: AKP’nin Politikasi Çözüm Degil Çözümsüzlük [“KCK: AKP’s policy is that of non-solution].” 
bianet.org. 1 October 2013.  
88 Cemil Bayık warned, “We are preparing ourselves for the return of the PKK units which have withdrawn from 
Turkey to Northern Kurdistan [Turkey’s Kurdish southeast] if the government doesn’t accept our conditions”. 
“Time running out for Turkey-PKK peace process”. Al-Monitor. 4 November 2013. 





politicians who had been charged with PKK/KCK membership and detained since the 
beginning of the lengthy KCK trials that began in 2009.90 
Furthermore, the AKP government took a radical step and passed a bill to “end terror 
and strengthen social integration” on 10 July, 2014. The bill aimed to create a legal framework 
for negotiations, as requested by the Kurdish National Movement. Following Erdoğan’s 
election to the presidency of the Republic in August 2014, the AKP announced that the peace 
process would be included in the program of the new government, led by Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu.91 Öcalan praised these developments, stating that the 30-year-old conflict 
had neared its end.92 
1.4. The Peace Process under the shadow of Regional Developments 
          When the civil war in Syria started in 2012, PKK-affiliated groups began to defend 
Kurds in Syria and Iraq against jihadist groups, in particular, Islamic State (IS). Following 
territorial gains and victories against jihadists, total disarmament and demobilization of the 
PKK became an unrealistic option. The war changed the role of the PKK, turning it into an 
important regional actor. This contributed to their renewed confidence, and new objectives for 
the Kurdish national movement in Turkey. While the PKK has officially abandoned its 
separatist goal, as of 2014, regional autonomy has risen to the top of its agenda, particularly 
with the establishment of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK), as a civil society platform 
                                                







of the KNM, which could be described as the unofficial precursor of a regional parliament in 
Turkey’s Kurdish southeast.93  
Within this context, the siege of Kobanê (in Arabic, Ayn al-arab), a Kurdish majority 
city in northern Syria, by Islamic State forces marked a turning point for the peace process, as 
it changed security strategies on both sides. The Turkish security bureaucracy had already 
voiced concerns about the exclusion of the military in the politician-led peace process. In 2014 
alone, the military asked for permission to carry out 290 operations against the PKK in the 
Kurdish southeast; for the sake of the peace process, only 8 were approved.94 However, with 
the increasing possibility of a Kurdish-controlled 511-mile border with Syria, the preferred 
security-related strategies of the military and the government began to converge.95 The 
government was particularly wary of the possibility that the success of the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (PYD)96 would lead to further separatism among Kurds in Turkey.97  
Faced with harsh criticism from opposition parties and the security bureaucracy, the 
government was pressured into taking some security measures during the withdrawal process, 
                                                
93 “DTK yeniden yapılandırılıyor [DTK is being re-structured]”. Al Jazeera Turk. 7 September 2014. 
94 “Talep 290, izin 8 [290 requests, 8 approved]”, Hurriyet. 19 September 2015. 
95 Turkey asked for a no-fly zone and refugee safe haven along a 98-km strip of the Syrian border, which the 
Kurdish movement viewed as an attempt to prevent KCK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya 
Demokrat, PYD) expansion. Later, the government announced plans for a high-level security barrier along its 
500-mile border with Syria. “Turkey to build 500-mile wall on Syria border after Isil Suruc bombing”. 
Telegraph. 23 July 2015. This was also viewed as an attempt against PYD expansion since, at that time, the PYD 
already controlled most of the Syrian-Turkish border. 
96 Syrian branch of the KCK umbrella organization. See Chapter 2.  
97 Selahattin Demirtas, HDP Co-Chair, stated “Kobanê is our internal matter…You can’t abandon Kurds in 
Kobanê…”. “Jailed PKK leader calls for speeding up peace process, warns of massacres: HDP co-chair”. 





as early as in mid-2013. As a result of regional developments in Syria and Iraq, Turkey’s 
military bureaucracy consolidated its position, and the government increased the pace of its 
construction of military outposts and dams in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, moves that were 
considered a re-securitization of the Kurdish question. A huge number of Turkish military 
personnel and armored vehicles were deployed as early as the summer of 2014. On 2 October, 
2014, a resolution permitting Turkey’s military to enter Iraq and Syria to join the campaign 
against the IS passed in the Turkish parliament, sparking outrage in the Kurdish National 
Movement.98  
Considering these developments, the Turkish government was wary of Kurdish gains, 
and remained silent on the siege of Kobanê. The delayed reaction to Syrian Kurds’ need for 
military and humanitarian aid triggered outrage among Turkey’s Kurds. Many sought to cross 
the border to join forces with Kurdish fighters and deliver humanitarian assistance to their kin. 
The Turkish government thwarted their efforts, giving rise to several large protests across 
Turkey on 6, 7, and 8 October, 2014, resulting in 50 deaths.99 In late October 2014, the 
government finally allowed a group of Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters to enter Kobanê from 
Turkey to help the Syrian Kurds.100  
                                                
98 “Islamic State: Turkish MPs back Iraq-Syria deployment.” BBC. 2 October 2014. 
99 “Most of the fighting was between pro-PKK and pro-HüdaPar groups. HüdaPar, a Kurdish pro-Islamist party, 
is widely regarded as a political revival of Hizbollah in Kurdish-speaking regions in Turkey. In the 1990s, the 
latter was used as a proxy by the Turkish state to murder scores of PKK supporters” (International Crisis Group 
2015). 
100 Turkey has a complicated relationship with Iraqi Kurds. For a long time, Turkey did not support the idea of an 
autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq. Given the large Kurdish population in its southeast, Turkey feared 
that it would threaten its territorial integrity. Yet, Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Turkish 






The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi, 
YDG-H) played an important role in the Kobanê protests. An urban youth militia of the KNM 
that was established in February 2013, it grew rapidly, with armed branches in cities in 
Turkey’s Kurdish southeast that had the capacity to draw Turkish security forces into street 
clashes. Since mid-2014, the urban warfare had been defined by street battles with heavy 
weapons. The YDG-H dug explosive-laden trenches and erected barricades in a bid to assert 
control of autonomous cities and neighborhoods.101 Despite its rapid rise after the PKK’s 
withdrawal and its ideological ties, the PKK has always denied controlling the group, although 
it acknowledges their efforts.102 
Although talks resumed in late October 2014, peace efforts were constrained on both 
sides by a need to double down on security strategies in the period following the Kobanê 
incidents. The Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (YDG-H)103 declared democratic 
autonomy in Cizre and Sur in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast104, and the government’s approach 
to the Kurdish Question became security-oriented once again. The government introduced a 
                                                
commercial interests and oil trade have made a rapprochement possible. Although the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) tolerates the PKK bases in its territory, the PKK and the KRG do not get along well. Both 
have disputes over the Syrian Kurdish autonomous regions in Northern Syria (Paasche 2015). “Iraqi Peshmerga 
Fighters cross into Kobanê” Al Jazeera.  1 November 2014. “Portre: Mesut Barzani [Portrait: Masoud Barzani]”. 
Al Jazeera. 8 April 2014. 
101 “Çözüm sürecinin maskelileri: YDG-H [The masked ones of the solution process]”. Aljazeera Turk. 19 
January 2015. 
102 “Bayık: Artık tek taraflı ateşkeş olmayacak [Bayık: There will be no more unilateral ceasefire]”. BBC Türkçe. 
30 November 2015. 
103  “PKK Youth Fight for Autonomy in Turkey”. Vice News. 13 February 2015. For detailed information see 
chapter II. 






highly-debated domestic security law that gave the police enhanced power.105 This sparked the 
concern of opposition parties, in particular the HDP. The bill was perceived as contradictory to 
the road map, and a sign of the government’s lack of sincerity about the peace process.106 
1.5. The last effort to save the peace process: Dolmabahçe Consensus 
In the midst of the hotly contested debate on domestic security, and increasing Kurdish 
anger over the Turkish government’s failure to support the Syrian Kurds in the fighting in 
Kobanê that raged from September 2014 until January 2015, the government and the Kurdish 
National Movement made a final endeavor to save the peace process. On 28 February, 2015, at 
the state-owned Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul, where President Erdoğan hosts events, 
Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan and senior officials from the government and the 
HDP jointly announced a 10-item list of priorities for the peace process.107 More importantly, 
                                                
105 The law criminalizes the use of fireworks, Molotov cocktails, iron balls, and straps in public meetings and 
demonstrations. Those who cover their faces partly or entirely during demonstrations may face sentences of up to 
five years in prison. The law also enables law enforcement officials to take a person into custody for up to 48 
hours if this person attends social events that may lead to a serious disruption of public order. “Turkey : 
Parliament approves domestic security package.” Middle East Eye. 27 March 2015. 
106 “Demirtas: İç güvenlik paketi geri çekilmezse direnişimizi artırarak sürdüreceğiz”. [Demirtas: If the domestic 
security bill is not withdrawn, we will increasingly pursue our resistance]. Yurt Gazetesi. 1 March 2015. 
107 The statement, as explained at the time by Hürriyet (“Kurdish peace call made amid row on security bill”), 
included: (1) definition and content of democratic politics; (2) defining a democratic solution’s national and local 
dimensions; (3) legal, democratic guarantees of citizenship; (4) state-society relations and how to institutionalise 
issues; (5) the resolution process’s socio-economic dimensions; (6) handling democracy-security ties during that 
process to sustain public order and freedoms; (7) legal solutions and warranties for policies on women, culture 
and ecology; (8) developing a pluralist democracy to define identity; (9) defining a democratic republic, common 
homeland and nation with democratic criteria and creating a legal and constitutional warranty within the pluralist 
democratic system; and (10) writing a constitution that internalises all democratic moves 





Öcalan’s letter urging the PKK to convene an extraordinary congress to lay down arms was 
read aloud on television in the presence of government officials. This was the first time the 
sides revealed the overall content of the peace talks, and the first time the government openly 
acknowledged Öcalan’s role as a peace partner. His call for disarmament was repeated when 
his letter was read to a crowd of over one million people gathered in Diyarbakır for Kurds’ 
Newroz Festival on 21 March, 2015.108 
Nevertheless, rather than revitalizing the peace process, the Dolmabahçe consensus 
revealed strains on the Turkish side, particularly between the government and President 
Erdoğan. On 18 March, the government announced its plan to discuss the establishment of a 
monitoring committee that would supervise and coordinate the implementation of the future 
peace agreement. President Erdoğan announced his objection to a monitoring committee, and 
disapproved of the Dolmabahçe consensus.109 He was dissatisfied with the nominations for the 
committee that the government, the HDP, and Öcalan had agreed on (International Crisis 
Group 2015). According to Pervin Buldan, President Erdoğan objected because he was 
excluded from the preparation of the list.110 Media reports confirmed that the monitoring 
committee was to observe the meeting between Öcalan, the PKK, the HDP, and the 
government. Yet the committee never convened, and the Kurdish delegation was no longer 
allowed to visit Öcalan after 5 April, 2015. 
                                                
108  “Renewing call to end Turkey conflict, Kurdish rebel leader hails new era”, The New York Times, 21 March 
2015. 
109 “Gov’t and HDP should not be in same picture, says Turkish President”, Hürriyet, 22 March 2015. 
110 “Pervin Buldan: Erdoğan listeye müdahale etmek istedi ancak... [Buldan: Erdoğan wanted to intervene on the 





1.6. The Peace Process collapses 
As the Kurdish side simmered in frustration and anger over the monitoring committee 
and the government’s reluctance to intervene in Kobanê, the run-up to the parliamentary 
elections on 7 June, 2015 became a battlefield between the HDP and the AKP. Political 
violence was directed at HDP offices across Turkey particularly.111 The AKP, though it 
condemned the attacks, toughened its tone on the HDP. Although the Constitution stipulates 
that the president must remain neutral, President Erdoğan actively engaged in the election 
campaign and targeted the opposition parties, especially the HDP.112  
On 7 June, 2015, the HDP won an unexpectedly high 13.1% of the total vote, attracting 
voters from the liberal and left-wing segments, as well as from the Islamist Kurds.113 Not only 
did it pass the 10% threshold for the first time as a pro-Kurdish party, it also secured 80 seats 
                                                
111 The Human Rights Association (IHD) estimates ten HDP members were killed in more than 175 attacks on 
the party before the June election. “HDP’ye Yönelik Bombalı ve Silahlı Saldırıları Kınıyor, Sorumluları 
Lanetliyoruz [“We condemn the bombings and armed attacks against the HDP and denounce those responsible”], 
IHD Statements. 6 June 2015.  
112 In addition to criticism from opposition parties, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) highlighted concerns over Erdoğan’s active role in the campaign. “Two members of Turkey’s top 
election body criticize Erdoğan’s role in campaigns”. Hürriyet Daily News.  15 May 2015. 
113 Since the Gezi Park protests, in the summer of 2013, which became a focal point for broader anti-government 
sentiment from the liberal and secular quarters of the Turkish population, the AKP government has lost the 
support of liberal democrats. Although the Gezi Park protests seemingly had little impact on the peace process in 
Fall 2013, they certainly contributed to voting mobility in favor of the HDP among liberal and left wing segments 
who are wary of Erdoğan’s authoritarian ambitions to change Turkey’s parliamentary system into a presidential 
one. For a broader understanding of the Gezi Park Protests, see Arat (2013). The government’s reluctant stance 
toward helping the Syrian Kurds in the siege of Kobanê by the Islamic State also alienated the conservative 
elements of the Kurdish population that had been close to the AKP. Consequently, “nearly all ethnic Kurds, 
including Islamist Kurds who used to support the AKP, voted in record numbers in June for the HDP…” (Yavuz 





in the parliament. With 40% of the vote, the AKP secured 258 of the 550 seats, but for the first 
time since 2002, it lost its majority to form a government.114  
Following the 7 June, 2015 election, the failure of the peace process loomed. The HDP 
delegation, which had formerly met with Öcalan, was twice denied authorization to see him, 
once immediately before, and once after the election. Taking false confidence from the victory 
of the HDP in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, the PKK announced on 11 July that neither the 
HDP nor Öcalan could order them to disarm, and that only the KCK had the competent 
authority for the decision of laying down arms.115 The government interpreted this as an end to 
the PKK’s ceasefire.   
When an explosion hit a Kurdish cultural center on 20 July in Turkey’s Kurdish 
southeastern city of Suruç, 10 kilometers outside of Kobanê, killing 32 pro-Kurdish activists, 
the Kurdish National Movement accused the acting AKP government of collusion with the 
Islamic State.116 On 22 July, 2015, two police officers were found dead in a house located in 
the district of Ceylanpınar, near the Syrian border; PKK militants claimed the murders.117 
Meanwhile, Turkey, giving in to pressure from the US-led coalition, changed its approach 
toward the Islamic State. Now, at the same time they were hitting IS targets, Turkish 
                                                
114 “Turkey ruling AKP loses majority in surprise result.” BBC. 7 June 2015. 
115 Ibid. 
116 “Bayık : AKP DAİŞ’tir DAİŞ de AKP ! [Bayık : AKP is the Islamic State as the Islamist State is the AKP !]”. 
Firat News Agency. 21 July 2015.     
117 The KCK denied any link between the killings and the PKK on 29 July 2015. The pro-PKK media, however, 
reported the attack as a retaliation against the Suruç bombings. It attributed the attack to the militia called Apoist 
team of self-sacrifice (Apocu Fedai Timi, AFT). “PKK: İki polisi öldürdüğünü söyleyen Apocu Fedai Timi 
bizden bağımsız, yerel güç [PKK: The Apoist Team of self-sacrifice, which claimed to kill two police officers 
independent of us, it is a local force]”. T24. 29 July 2015. “HPG: Two police officers punished by Apoist team of 





warplanes started bombing multiple PKK bases in Northern Iraq, and KCK-affiliated Kurdish 
bases in Syria. By the end of July 2015, communication channels between Turkey and the 
PKK were cut off. The two and a half-year-old ceasefire ended and the peace process 
collapsed.  
2. Findings 
This part discusses the findings of the case study, namely the third round of the PKK-Turkey 
peace talks, between December 2012 and July 2015. After providing the context of the peace 
talks, the bargaining practices, which became a source of information asymmetries and 
commitment problems, are analyzed.  
2.1 Bargaining Theory of War 
The third round of peace talks between the PKK and Turkey can be classified as a 
bargaining scenario as defined by the bargaining theory of war. There were two sides 
interacting over uncertain terms of a set of agreements. While there were incentives on both 
sides to secure a cooperative outcome, there were also incentives to profit as much as possible 
from the peace process. Both sides had rational justifications for the attacks they continued to 
conduct throughout the peace process, and for bringing any crisis back to the brink of war. 
Under the bargaining model, commitment problems and asymmetric information are 
identified as the main causes of failure (Rauchhaus 2006; Walter 1997; 2006; 2009). When we 
look into the PKK-Turkey peace process, we identify three bargaining practices that have 
either caused or contributed to deepening commitment problems and asymmetric information: 





(2) the lack of a legal framework for conducting peace talks; (3) the rejection of third-party 
intervention.  
These bargaining practices are easy to observe throughout the talks and they reflect the 
imbalance of power between Turkey and the PKK: each practice is imposed by the Turkish 
government and together, they constitute some of the most important regularly occurring 
events or actions taken during the third round. Before delving into bargaining practices, the 
context of the peace talks in which these bargaining practices are carried out, will be 
discussed.   
2.2. Context of Negotiations  
The third round of peace talks witnessed two sets of tensions which negatively affected 
the peace process: (1) Tensions between short-term and long-term goals; (2) Increased 
readiness of both sides to fight. Though such tensions are not uncommon for intrastate 
conflicts, they made the peace process fragile and provided a basis for back-up plans in case 
the peace process failed. 
2.2.1. Tensions between short-term and long-term goals 
Short-term and long-term goals were at odds with one another throughout the third 
round of peace talks. Instead of finding a mutually agreeable solution, both sides focused on 
extracting immediate political benefits from the peace process. The government and the 
Kurdish National Movement were more than willing to propose and accept arrangements that 
secured some of their other interests; they were less willing to make sacrifices for the long-





order to get the support of the BDP/HDP, he was willing to agree to the regional autonomy of 
Turkey’s Kurdish southeast.118 As early as February 2013, Öcalan stated,  
We can think of an executive presidential system. We will support the presidency of 
Tayyip Erdoğan. We can go into an alliance with the AKP on this basis. However, the 
presidential system should be like the US one, with a senate as a state assembly. 
Second, there should be an assembly of the people. This you can call the democratic 
assembly, like the House of Representatives in the US (…) In this context, we can turn 
the Peoples’ Democratic Congress into a parliament.119 
 
However, in an illustration of the theoretical point that, while information sufficient to 
reach a settlement may be collected, it becomes “obsolete as new alliances are formed” 
(Walter 2009: 253), the early plan of trading a presidential system for decentralization 
collapsed when the HDP began to expand its traditional constituency. In the presidential 
elections of 2014, the HDP attracted the votes of liberal democrats who previously supported 
the AKP but who turned away from the ruling party after the Gezi Park protests in the summer 
of 2013. The HDP also gained the votes of conservative Kurds who had also previously voted 
for the AKP following the Kobanê riots in October 2013. As a result of this voting mobility in 
favor of the HDP, the party’s candidate, Demirtaş, won 9.8% of the total vote on 10 August 
2014. Thus, and given that the national threshold for parliamentary elections was 10%, the 
HDP decided to enter the 7 June 2015 parliamentary elections as a party for the first time. This 
changed its strategy, as it was no longer willing to make a secret deal with the AKP in 
exchange for the peace process. On 17 March, 2015, referring to Erdoğan’s ambition to 
                                                
118 The AKP government announced its intention to introduce a “Turkified version of the U.S. executive system”, 
in November 2012, which would strengthen the executive branch, and ultimately transform the regime. In March 
2013, in the beginning of the third round of the peace process, the AKP MPs of the Constitutional Commission 
insisted on a proposal to switch to a presidential system of government in conjunction with the peace process.  
 “AK Party proposes its version of presidential system”. Hurriyet Daily News. 22 November 2012.  





transform the system into a presidential one, the HDP’s co-leader stated, “We will not make 
you the president”; this would later become the party’s election campaign slogan.120 The run-
up to the 7 June 2015 parliamentary election created a fierce rivalry between the AKP and the 
HDP. The HDP won an unexpectedly high 13.1% of the total vote. As a result, the AKP lost 
its majority to form a government. The AKP fulminated against the HDP’s success. The first 
reaction to the elections result came from Yalçın Akdoğan, the deputy prime minister, who 
said, “The HDP can only shoot the movie of the Kurdish peace process,” and continued, “If 
they got 13% of the votes, they should call on Qandil and make the PKK lay down arms”.121  
The peace process was thus highly susceptible to become hostage to short-term 
interests. Short-term calculations led to actions that had unintended consequences and 
contributed to derailing the process.  
2.2.2. Increased readiness of both sides to fight 
Despite the 2.5-year ceasefire and the ongoing peace talks, both sides simultaneously 
prepared for fighting, in case the peace talks failed. This finally resulted in the resumption of 
violence in July 2015. 
Both sides took actions that brought security costs to the other party. The most notable 
escalations included the construction of military posts by the government, and the creation and 
armament of urban youth movements by the PKK. From the beginning of the third round in 
late December, the Turkish government began to construct military outposts and dams in 
Turkey’s Kurdish southeast despite the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire. The government 
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accelerated this process dramatically during the PKK’s withdrawal.122 According to the 
government, this decision was made in response to the ongoing civil war in Syria; however, 
the PKK pointed out that the new outposts were located on the routes they traditionally used 
during their annual withdrawal to Northern Iraq in the fall (and return to Turkey in the spring). 
On 29 June, 2013, a group of pro-PKK protestors tried to block the construction of a military 
post by setting the workers’ tent on fire with Molotov cocktails; during the incident, the 
gendarmerie killed one protestor and injured nine others. This ignited large-scale protests in 
cities and towns across Turkey, including Istanbul.123 The PKK issued a warning that 
negotiations might fail.124 
While Turkey was constructing military outposts and dams, in February 2013, pro-
Kurdish media announced the formation of the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement 
(Devrimci Yurtsever Gençlik Hareketi, YDG-H).125 A youth militia sympathetic to Öcalan and 
the PKK ideology, the YDG-H grew rapidly in urban areas in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast, 
with the capacity to turn street clashes with Turkish security forces into urban guerilla warfare. 
In addition to fireworks and Molotov cocktails, YDG-H militants started to carry automatic 
rifles (AK-47) and heavy weapons (rocket-propelled grenades, RPGs), especially after 
                                                
122 “Karakol yapımı devam ediyor [The construction of military posts continues]”. AK Parti Haberler. 13 July 
2013 
123 “Lice’de karakol inşaatında olay: 1ölü, 9 yaralı [Incidents in the construction of a military post near Lice: 1 
killed, 9 wounded]”. Hürriyet. 29 June, 2013. 
124 “PKK çekilmeyi durdurdu. [PKK ended withdrawal]”. BBC Türkçe. 1 August, 2016.  
125 Since its formation in February 2013, the YDG-H has spread across Turkey’s Kurdish southeast by 
establishing public order units, issuing certificates to their members. You can watch one of the ceremonies 
organized by YDG-H Public Order Unit in Cizre, a district of Turkey’s southeastern province of Şırnak. On 





Kurdish riots spread across the country from 6 to 8 October, 2014 over Turkey’s reluctance to 
help Syrian Kurds fighting against the Islamic State in the Syrian border town of Kobanê.126 
After the Kobanê riots, the YDG-H gradually extended its activities and began to 
declare autonomous cities and neighborhoods. In response, Turkey tightened its public 
security policies. On 30 October, 2015, under President Erdoğan’s chairmanship, the National 
Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurumu, MGK) took an important decision to give public 
safety and security priority over the peace process.127 This decision marked the return to a 
security-oriented approach to the Kurdish question, which had been held in abeyance since the 
beginning of the paradigm shift that occurred in 2005, when then-Prime Minister Erdoğan 
acknowledged the existence of Turkey’s Kurdish question.128 Most importantly, the National 
Security Council’s intervention indicated that the military had increasingly consolidated its 
position in Turkish politics.129 In early 2015, the government passed a public security bill 
                                                
126 You can watch an online video shot by Vice News of the Kurdish riots in Istanbul (30 October 2014) on 
https://news.vice.com/video/istanbuls-kurdish-
riots?utm_source=vicenewsyoutube&utm_medium=video&utm_campaign=relatedvideo. (6 November 2016). 
The 6-8 October anti-government protests “6-7 Ekim’in ac bilançosu 50 Ölü [the heavy loss of 6-7 October : 50 
deaths ]” Hürriyet 6 November, 2014. 
127 The peace process was endorsed by the MGK for the first time during its 25 June, 2013 meeting. In its 30 
October, 2015 statement, the MGK, while recognizing the positive environment hitherto created by the peace 
process, casts a wary eye on its progress: “The Turkish state will strive to fight against illegal entities who 
operate under a legal appearance … [and] determination will be displayed to prevent provocative actions geared 
towards harming the positive atmosphere created by the solution process, initiated to fight against terrorism in a 
multidimensional approach, and all measures to ensure national security and public safety will be taken.” “30 
Ekim 2014 tarihli Toplantı [the meeting on 30 October 2014]” MGK. www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/30-ekim-2014-
tarihli-toplanti.  30 October 2014.  
128 “Disarming the PKK: The critical stage in the Kurdish Issue”. Daily Sabah. 5 May 2015. 
129 The National Security Council was considered to be the formal institutional channel that allowed the Turkish 






expanding police powers to detain demonstrators without a court warrant and to allow the use 
of deadly force during violent protests.130 This sparked the concern of opposition parties, 
particularly that of the HDP. The bill was perceived as contradictory to the road map131 and a 
sign of the government’s lack of sincerity in the peace process.132 
In this context, three bargaining practices, identified above as (1) the use of the PKK’s 
jailed leader Öcalan, as the sole interlocutor on the Kurdish side; (2) the lack of a legal 
framework for conducting peace talks; (3) rejection of third-party intervention, marked the 
third round of the peace process.  
2.3. Bargaining Practices 
2.3.1. Öcalan as the only interlocutor  
During the third round of talks, Öcalan played a larger role than either the PKK’s 
armed wing or its European wing. During the first and second round of peace talks, known as 
the Oslo Process, state officials had worked with a PKK delegation including members of the 
party’s European and military wings (Ünal 2016). In the third round, they were left out of 
direct talks. Instead, the government allowed members of parliament from the pro-Kurdish 
BDP/HDP to act as mere intermediaries between the government and Öcalan, and between the 
                                                
relations underwent a dramatic change due to Turkey’s EU process and the AKP’s democratization efforts. 
However, The MGK’s 30 October statement was perceived as a return to a security-oriented approach to the 
Kurdish question. For further information see Kaynar (2016).  
130 “Explained: Turkey’s controversial security bill”. Hurriyet Daily News. 21 February 2015. 
131 The Minister of Justice, Sadullah Ergin, laid out a road map for peace as follows: (1) ceasefire and withdrawal 
of the PKK from Turkish soil, (2) democratization, and (3) disarmament of the PKK and normalization. “Bakan 
Ergin’den Öcalan açiklamasi [Statement about Öcalan from Minister Ergin]”. Sabah. 29 March 2013. 
132 “Demirtas: İç güvenlik paketi geri çekilmezse direnişimizi artırarak sürdüreceğiz [Demirtas: If the domestic 





KCK and Öcalan.133 Thus, Turkey conducted peace talks with Öcalan sitting in his prison cell 
on İmralı Island, without consulting either the pro-Kurdish party BDP/HDP or the PKK.  
While the decision to make Öcalan into the chief negotiator was almost universally 
approved by pro-Kurdish groups, the peace process was conducted in a way that inhibited the 
flow of information on the Kurdish side. For instance, the government had the final say on the 
makeup of the Kurdish committee that visited Öcalan and it dictated the schedule of this 
committee’s meetings with the imprisoned leader.134 Öcalan was allowed to send letters to the 
KCK leadership, but most of their letters back were not delivered.135 The government also 
used access to Öcalan as leverage during the talks. For instance, when the two parties 
disagreed in 2015 over the establishment of a monitoring committee that would supervise and 
coordinate the implementation of the future peace agreement,136 after April 2015, the 
government withdrew the HDP delegation’s authorization to visit Öcalan to signal its 
disapproval. 
                                                
133 HDP Delegation visited the KCK leadership in Qandil about five times throughout the process to convey 
Öcalan’s message. “Kronoloji: 2013 Nevruz’undan bugüne [Chronology: From 2013 Newroz till the present]”. Al 
Jazeera Türk. 19 March 2014. When the HDP Delegation weren’t given the authorization to meet with Öcalan 
after April 2015, they visited the KCK in Qandil in May 2015 before the June 2015 elections. “HDP cannot 
contribute to democracy under PKK tutelage”. Daily Sabah. 19 May 2015.    
134 “…we learnt, at this meeting, that Qandil [the KCK]’s letters were not delivered to Mr Öcalan. The letter 
containing his three suggestions, that he previously sent to the state and the government has not been responded 
to yet. As you know, these three suggestions included legal arrangements for his condition, enabling and ensuring 
conditions for democratic politics, and the active involvement of a monitoring committee in the process.” 
 “KCK’nin mektuplari Öcalan’a verilmedi [The letters of the KCK were not delivered to Öcalan]” Firat News 
Agency.  29 November 2013 
135 Ibid. 





In addition, although the Kurdish delegation’s visits were widely covered by the 
media, the information about the visits could only be made public upon approval by the 
Turkish government.137 Most of the substance remained secret. Information became a scarce 
commodity, vulnerable to manipulation. For example, following the public reading of 
Öcalan’s Newroz letter, in May 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan referred to the letter to call for 
the immediate withdrawal of PKK militants outside of Turkey, leaving their weapons behind. 
For its part, the PKK, though it welcomed Öcalan’s call, refused to comply with Erdoğan’s 
request. This resulted in tension. In fact, while Öcalan’s letter had called for the PKK to 
withdraw, it did not mention the modality of the withdrawal process and had remained silent 
on the issue of the weapons. In May 2013, after the BDP/HDP delegation’s April visit to 
Öcalan, the details of which were not disclosed to the public, the PKK started to withdraw 
with their weapons.138  
The decision to select Öcalan as the only interlocutor and exclude other Kurdish 
representatives created uncertainty by inhibiting the flow of information on the Kurdish side, 
making them vulnerable to forces opposed to peace.  In accordance with rationalist 
explanations, a fully rational agent may end up in war because of their uncertainty about the 
rationality of adversaries, the PKK increasingly became wary of the peace process due to the 
                                                
137 “Cemil Bayık: ABD arabulucu olsun; Müzakereye oturulmazsa ya iç savaş gelişir ya da darbe [Cemil Bayık : 
USA should mediate; Unless negotiations begin, a civil war or a coup d’État may develop]” T24. 23 December 
2014.  
138 The PKK announced that the withdrawal of its armed forces from Turkish territory would start on 8 May 
2013. Early PKK estimates expected the withdrawal of 2,000 rebels to take some five months. Early accounts of 
the withdrawal process reported that small groups of PKK rebels were moving toward the Iraqi border, although 
not laying down their arms as required by the Turkish government. “PKK begins to withdraw from Turkey”. 





asymmetric information. Consequently, the expectation captured by Hypothesis 2 in our 
analytical framework and suggesting that the inability of warring parties to credibly commit to 
the bargain increases the likelihood of negotiation failures, was clearly met.  
2.3.2. Lack of legal framework 
The second bargaining practice that marked the peace process was the absence of a 
legal framework. A legal framework for peace talks would have provided a context in which 
(1) the Turkish government would pass a series of reforms about the root causes of the PKK-
Turkey conflict, (2) the peace talks would be conducted in a systematic and legalized fashion, 
(3) the withdrawal of the PKK to outside Turkey would be accomplished without falling into 
the trap of commitment problems.  
The absence of a legal framework for peace talks became the bane of both sides. 
Without a legal framework, the talks were vulnerable to forces opposing to peace, something 
that became clear in March 2012 when a faction of the Turkish state that opposed the peace 
process launched an investigation into state officials involved in the talks.139 Another 
illustration of the vulnerability of the talks was provided by the example of the opposition 
party MHP, which declared that any attempt at settlement was a betrayal of Turkey and filed 
complaints against the government officials throughout the third round. For instance, on 1 
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self-imposed exile Muslim cleric Fettullah Gülen, was behind this attempt to jeopardize the peace process. 
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March, 2015, the MHP reacted to the Dolmabahçe Consensus by accusing Erdoğan and the 
AKP of “treason” and “losing their national bond” with the Turkish people.140  
Due to the plots, attacks, and allegations against the government officials who were 
involved in the peace process, the government had begun to strengthen the legal status of state 
officials meeting with Öcalan as early as in 2013. They gave formal recognition to the peace 
process by establishing a commission responsible for it in the Turkish Parliament.141 In April 
2014, the government also passed a bill granting Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization 
(Milli Istihbarat Teşkilatı, MIT) the authority to meet and negotiate with terrorist 
organizations. Soon after, on 10 July, 2014, the government passed another bill to “end terror 
and strengthen social integration”. The law allowed state representatives other than MIT 
officials to contact terrorists, in order to ensure disarmament and to take other steps for greater 
accountability and transparency.142 
While these efforts provided a legal framework to protect Turkish state officials, no 
measures were taken to either allow the creation of a united Kurdish negotiating team, nor was 
any action taken to define common end goals in a legal framework that would entail a 
comprehensive agenda, a clear timeframe, mutually agreed ground rules and a monitoring 
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BDP. The official name of the commission is the Parliamentary Investigation Commission for the Assessment of 
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committee for the withdrawal of the PKK’s armed elements to outside Turkey. This not only 
allowed the government to minimize the number of interlocutors in the process, but also made 
the process less a long-term project than a series of ad hoc initiatives. For instance, due to the 
lack of a monitoring mechanism, the PKK was wary of withdrawing its armed elements 
outside of Turkey. Before the PKK’s withdrawal, which started in May 2013, the government 
had taken two confidence-building steps143 but none of them were fully able to put an end the 
commitment problem the PKK faced during its withdrawal. Eventually, the PKK would 
suspend the withdrawal in September 2013, to protest the government’s inaction on the peace 
process. Following this suspension, and in an effort to keep the process on track, the AKP 
government passed a democracy package that involved a series of reforms in regard to 
Kurdish grievances.144 Nevertheless, neither the PKK nor the BDP/HDP leaders were 
satisfied. The BDP co-leader, Demirtaş, was particularly vocal in expressing the 
disappointment felt by many Kurds with the content of the reforms, particularly because this 
was the result of a unilateral move by the government, without consultation with the 
BDP/HDP lawmakers in parliament.145 In addition, the reforms did not address the modality of 
the PKK’s withdrawal. Rather than build confidence, the reforms failed to convince the PKK 
to resume withdrawal. 
Because there was no legal framework for the two sides to jointly discuss the peace 
process in a way that would reduce the uncertainty, each began to announce their own 
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interpretation of the road map for peace. This was clear when the Minister of Justice, Sadullah 
Ergin, laid out a road map as follows: (1) ceasefire and withdrawal of the PKK from Turkish 
soil, (2) democratization, and (3) disarmament of the PKK and normalization.146 Soon after the 
government’s announcement of the roadmap, the PKK’s military leader, Murat Karayılan, 
criticized it and provided the PKK’s version.147  
Furthermore, the sides disagreed about the timing of mutual steps in carrying out this 
road map. They disagreed about whether each stage should be completed before beginning the 
next one, or whether confidence in one another’s intentions was sufficient to move the process 
along. Turkey’s security bureaucracy and Prime Minister Erdoğan insisted that the PKK 
should withdraw its armed elements, leaving weapons behind. The PKK, however, expected to 
withdraw its armed units with their weapons, while the government took steps towards 
democratization.148 Hence, when Öcalan called on the PKK to withdraw its armed elements 
from within Turkish borders, some PKK leaders criticized him for surrendering territory.149 
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The absence of a united negotiating team on the Kurdish side thus hindered the efficient 
implementation of the decisions taken by Öcalan and state officials. 
Consequently, the lack of a legal framework became a source of asymmetric 
information between both sides and produced commitment problems, in particular during the 
PKK’s withdrawal process. Because there were no systematic and legal provisions in 
conducting the peace talks, the future of the peace process became uncertain and open to 
manipulations of forces opposing to peace from both sides. Both sides often exchanged harsh 
rhetoric, which further deepened mistrust between them. Every step was taken only after a 
threat from either side or a potential risk damaging the peace process had been experienced. 
The lack of a legal framework rendered all real progress impossible. Hypothesis 2, which 
asserts the inability of warring parties to credibly commit the bargain they may reach increases 
the likelihood of negotiation failures, thus offers a plausible account of failure. 
2.3.3. Rejection of Third-Party Intervention 
The purpose of a third-party intervention in a peace process is to reduce uncertainty 
(by reducing asymmetric information), ensuring compliance and effective progress toward the 
goal. A third party may also raise the cost of returning to the battlefield, and increase the 
benefits of peace (Fortna 2008). Turkey’s rejection of third-party intervention will be analyzed 
in two steps. I will first discuss the necessity of a third-party intervention and I will then 
evaluate the possibility of ensuring third-party intervention. 
2.3.3.1. Necessity of third-party intervention 
In contrast to the previous rounds, the third round of the peace process was held 





involvement under the pretext that it had not yielded positive results in previous rounds. It is 
useful to recall that previous rounds were held in secret, and that, according to information 
leaked on the Internet, the talks were facilitated by Norway and coordinated by the United 
Kingdom (Philips 2015). 
At the outset of the third round, in late December 2012, the government assured the 
public that the peace process wouldn’t be hidden from them, yet the contents of the talks were 
revealed to a very limited degree. The Kurdish side voiced concerns, saying they couldn’t 
secure credible information because of the way the peace talks were being conducted. 150 The 
PKK’s armed wing, Öcalan, and the BDP/HDP all repeatedly expressed the need for a 
monitoring committee, but the government held fast to its position against third-party 
involvement.151 On 15 November, 2014, Prime Minister Davutoğlu stated that the peace 
process was an internal matter of Turkey, and should be carried out among its citizens, and 
cited third-party involvement as a cause of the failure of previous rounds.152  
Although there was no official monitoring mechanism during the early phases of the 
withdrawal of PKK militants from Turkey, it was unofficially monitored by a delegation of 
Kurdish journalists and BDP/HDP politicians.153 However, the lack of reliable information fed 
suspicions on both sides, and mutual accusations were recorded throughout the summer of 
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2013. The withdrawal process illustrates the importance of third-party involvement for 
independent verification. In the absence of such verification, perceptions remain subjective 
and open to manipulation.  
The imbalance of power between Turkey and the PKK coupled with mutual mistrust 
resulted in a commitment problem. Turkey did not want to make any compromises before the 
PKK’s withdrawal and disarmament, and the PKK was unwilling to withdraw or disarm 
without a mechanism in place to guarantee the enforcement of a peace deal. Thus, both parties 
anticipated the failure of negotiations, and prepared to fight.  
Asymmetric information and commitment problems may have been overcome if there 
had been a third party to bridge the power gap between parties and reduce uncertainty by 
providing a monitoring committee (Walter 1997; Fortna 2008). The need for a third-party 
mechanism, especially in regards to the withdrawal process of PKK militants from Turkey, 
and the way the peace talks were conducted, is retrospectively obvious. Therefore, Hypothesis 
3, which asserts that negotiations are more likely to fail when there is no third party to redress 
the relative balance of power and reduce uncertainty between parties in conflict, offers a 
plausible account of failure.154  
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2.3.3.2. Possibility of third-party intervention 
While the Turkish government firmly rejected the idea of third-party involvement,155 
the PKK’s repeated calls for third-party intervention and the recent developments in the 
region, namely the Syrian civil war and the rise of Islamic State, became the major challenge 
in this respect. Indeed, regional developments created a policy gap between Turkey and its 
major allies in the west regarding the Kurdish question. Although the European Union, the 
UN, and NATO supported the peace process, they had little impact on this matter. Therefore, 
they will not be analyzed here. Instead, the analysis will focus on Turkey’s main allies in the 
west with assertive foreign policy in the Middle East, namely the United Kingdom and the 
United States.  
From the beginning of the third round, the Kurdish side wanted a third-party witness to 
the peace talks that could investigate responsibility on each side in case of a breach. After the 
failure of the withdrawal process, in September 2013, the PKK stepped up its demands.156 
Cemil Bayık, a PKK leader, called insistently for a third party to oversee any further steps in 
the peace process.157 In November 2014, in the aftermath of the Kurdish riots over Kobanê, he 
said, “We have now reached the point where there has to be movement. That is why we are 
suggesting that a third power observe this process. This could be the United States. It could 
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also be an international delegation.” He repeated, “We would also accept Americans. In our 
view, it is moving in this direction”.158  
In contrast to the Oslo process, namely the first and second round of peace talks, the 
United Kingdom was not involved in the peace talks. At the same time, however, in the 
beginning of the third round, both sides jointly visited Britain and Northern Ireland to learn 
about the Good Friday Accords that brought a peaceful settlement to the Northern Ireland 
conflict.159 Furthermore, the UK repeatedly endorsed the third round. When Öcalan urged the 
PKK to convene an extraordinary congress to lay down arms, the UK praised the peace efforts 
by saying that it was ready to help make it work.160 
While growing suspicious about some developments - Turkey’s reluctance to counter 
IS and hostility against the PYD-run Kurdish enclaves in Syria – during the third round of 
peace talks, the UK considered Turkey as an increasingly important strategic ally. Besides 
being a NATO member, the UK’s foreign policy interests overlap significantly with the 
Turkish government’s on issues relating to the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq 
(KRG). Both the UK and Turkey have very close ties with the KRG. The British government 
sees the oil-rich KRG as vital to the UK’s long-term energy security.161 Turkey, for its part, is 
a major actor in the security of the KRG’s pipeline.162 British-Turkish joint venture Genel 
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Energy is the largest holder of oil reserves and resources in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.163 
Furthermore, the UK gives clear signals that a future KRG independence would be respected 
and recognized.164 
In this instance, had the UK been asked to intervene, its bilateral relations with Turkey 
would probably have taken precedence over the Turkey-PKK peace process, as there was far 
too much at stake had the UK decided to remove the PKK - with which the KRG has also been 
on the outs - from its list of designated terrorist groups or directly engaged with the KCK-
affiliate PYD in Syria. The United Kingdom was largely reluctant to put into action such a 
foreign policy that would confront Turkey.165  
The US had long downplayed the significance of the Kurdish question in its bilateral 
relations with Turkey, yet a policy gap emerged between the two states in relation to the 
greater Kurdish question in the Middle East. Their first disagreement was over Turkey’s 
relations with the KRG, which they maintained at the expense of their relationship with the 
central government in Iraq. They also disagreed on the potential use of KCK-affiliated PYD 
fighters in the Syrian civil war.  
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Despite the inconsistencies in its policy toward the KRG,166 Turkey has close working 
relations with the KRG. Turkey remained silent when the KRG took control of disputed 
territories, including the city of Kirkuk.167 More significantly, the Turkish government did not 
oppose a potential Iraqi Kurdish declaration of independence. The AKP spokesperson, 
Hüseyin, said, “The Kurds of Iraq can decide for themselves the name and type of the entity 
they live in”.168 In the past, any attempt by Kurds to claim independence would have 
constituted a redline for Turkey.  
In addition, Turkey clearly prefers the KRG to the overall KCK structures that operate 
in Turkey and Syria. For instance, in October 2014, in the midst of clashes between the PYD 
and the IS in the northern Syrian city of Kobanê, the Turkish government facilitated the transit 
of Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga groups through Turkey. Yet the same Turkish government did not 
allow Turkey’s Kurdish fighters to join the PYD in Kobanê, nor did it deliver weapons to 
them.169 
The second disagreement between Turkey and the US emerged after the PYD (a KCK 
affiliate) gained prestige fighting against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria. This disagreement 
became evident on 20 October, 2014, as US military aircrafts began to provide military 
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support and humanitarian aid to PYD fighters battling IS.170 Since the advent of IS in Iraq and 
Syria, and Turkey’s reluctance to take it on, the US government has raised questions about 
Turkey’s goals and foreign policy.171 While Turkish-American relations soured, the PYD and 
the HDP began to receive serious attention from the US (Bezci 2015). The success of KCK 
elements fighting against the IS, namely the PYD in Syria and the PKK in Iraq, paved the way 
for an alliance between them and American forces on the ground. Furthermore, as of 2014, the 
idea of removing the PKK from the list of terrorist organizations began to have widespread 
media coverage, and to be discussed seriously by the most influential think tanks in the US. 
For instance, Hoffmand and Werz (2014) stated, “It might be time to acknowledge that the 
PKK, once a malicious terrorist organization guilty of targeting civilians (…) has morphed 
into a militant political group…” 
Shifting regional alliance patterns have had an impact on the Turkey-PKK peace 
process. Turkey makes no distinction between the PYD, the PKK, and IS.172 On the day before 
the US military made airdrops in Kobanê, on 19 October, 2014, President Erdoğan stated that 
“it would be wrong for the United States— with whom we are friends and allies in NATO — 
(…) to expect us to agree to support terrorists.”173 The government feared that US military 
equipment delivered to the PYD might end up in the hands of PKK militants in Turkey. 
Turkey feared, as well, that the emergence of a new Kurdish autonomous region near its 
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border would “translate into rising recruitment potential and support for separatism among 
Kurds in Turkey” (International Crisis Group 2015). 
 For its part, the Kurdish National Movement viewed Turkey’s policy toward Rojava 
(the PYD-run enclaves in northern Syria) as part of the peace process. During the battle for 
Kobanê, Öcalan said, “the fall of Kobanê in Syrian Kurdistan would kill the peace process.” 
The PYD’s victory in Kobanê in early 2015, with the support of the US military, and its other 
advances in Syria, had a tremendous impact on the Kurdish National Movement (KNM) in 
Turkey. With the participation of HDP lawmakers, thousands of Kurds took to the streets 
across Turkey to celebrate the victory, waving the flags of the various KCK elements, 
including the PKK.174 The KNM sought to internationalize the peace process, using its new 
reputation for fighting against the IS, and repeatedly called for third party involvement in the 
peace process, particularly from the US.  
However, these developments did not cause a breaking point in Turkish-American 
relations. Turkey is an important strategic ally of the US. As a NATO member since 1952, 
Turkey played a crucial role for the US during the Cold War. The US has a military base in 
Incirlik, near the Syrian-Turkish border, and has important security agreements with Turkey, 
particularly in relation to counter-terrorism.175 Thus, the US’ greater policy interests prevented 
it from removing the PKK from its list of terrorist organizations. Nevertheless, the US 
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designates neither the PYD nor the KCK176 as terrorist groups, and it sees no obstacle to 
working with them in Syria (Bezci 2015).  
In the end, neither the UK nor the US intervened in the Turkey-PKK peace talks 
against Turkey’s will. The expectations captured by Hypothesis 4, which asserts that when 
third parties cannot or do not want to redress the balance of power, negotiations are more 
likely to fail, are clearly met. 
 In deference to its strategic alliance with Turkey, the US refrained from involving 
itself directly as a third party in the peace process; however, its new foreign policy on the 
Kurds, advancing its interests in Syria and Iraq, resulted in a shift in the balance of power in 
favor of the PKK. Turkey made a tremendous effort to keep the process “national, local and 
authentic,” to use the Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s terms,177 while the KNM endeavored to 
internationalize the peace process against Turkey’s will. 
Consequently, the PKK’s two-and-half-year ceasefire with Turkey and the KCK’s US-
backed military success against the IS both in Syria and Iraq brought increasing international 
reputation to the PKK. While the PKK was confident their international position was 
improving, Turkey grew concerned that the PKK would be able to consolidate its power in the 
region as the Syrian crisis dragged on. This forced Turkey to revise its stance on the IS; under 
international pressure, Turkey eventually joined the US-led coalition against the IS on 25 July, 
2015. Seeing its role in the fight as opportunity and insurance against the KCK ambitions in 
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northern Syria and Iraq, Turkey began shelling IS targets at the same time as KCK-affiliate 
PYD and PKK targets in Syria and Iraq.178 Therefore, Hypothesis 3, which asserts that the 
asymmetric information and/or uncertainty warring parties have about each other’s relative 
power increases the likelihood of negotiation failure, offers an explanation for negotiation 
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This research essay sought to explain bargaining failures in intrastate conflicts by 
drawing on the empirical analysis of the Turkey-PKK peace process. It asked specifically why 
the third round of the Turkey-PKK peace talks (from December of 2012 to July 2015) 
collapsed. To respond to this research question, the first chapter contained an overview of the 
rationalist approach to war, or, simply, bargaining theory of war and that of the literature on 
third-party interventions as one possible explanation of the failure of the PKK-Turkey peace 
process. Chapter II provided an overview of Turkey’s Kurdish question and the historical 
evolution of the Kurdish National Movement by focusing on the PKK. Furthermore, the 
chapter provided a chronological overview of the armed struggle between the PKK and 
Turkey, including the first two rounds of the failed peace process. Chapter III provided an 
analytic summary of the case study, namely the third round of the PKK-Turkey peace 
negotiations, between December 2012 and July 2015, and more importantly, assessed the 
various hypotheses by using the data compiled for the case study.  
The bargaining theory directs attention to the inherently strategic nature of wars. The 
main idea of bargaining theory is that, because war is costly, there must be a negotiated 
settlement that will leave both sides better off than if they actually fight. In this regard, war is 
a bargaining failure and it can be avoided in the absence of bargaining imperfections. 
Although both sides are better off bargaining rather than fighting, the theory postulates that 
negotiations are more likely to fail under two conditions: asymmetric information and 
commitment problems. First, bargaining failure is more likely when warring parties have 





information. It is assumed that each party knows its own costs of fighting but may not be sure 
about its opponent’s costs. This creates an uncertainty. Information problems are more severe 
in intrastate conflicts because it tends to be more difficult to obtain information about the 
military capabilities of non-state armed groups (NSAGs). Second, bargaining failure is more 
likely when bargaining is not credible. Commitment problems are more severe in intrastate 
conflicts due to the large power asymmetries between states and NSAGs (Walter 2009). The 
existing literature on third-party interventions also offers an account of bargaining failures. A 
third-party intervention may reduce uncertainty by monitoring compliance, redress the relative 
balance of power, and maintain it during the peace talks in order to make peace a desired 
outcome for both sides (Fortna 2008). However, a third party’s decision to intervene in a 
peace process is an important foreign policy choice. It largely depends on a third country’s 
ability and willingness to intervene (Starr 2005). Thus some conflicts do not easily lend 
themselves to third-party intervention (Walter 2009).  
This theoretical ground provided me with the conceptual apparatus to make sense of 
the way both parties conducted the third round of talks. They were bound by strategic actions 
and unintended consequences. The government imposed a repertoire of bargaining practices 
that expressed the large power asymmetries between Turkey and the PKK. They were 
obviously with a view to (1) minimizing the private information the Kurdish side has, and (2) 
exerting the government’s full control over the peace process. These practices were the 
following: (1) the selection of Öcalan as the sole interlocutor on the Kurdish side, (2) the lack 
of a legal framework for conducting peace talks, and (3) the rejection of third-party 
intervention. First, the decision to select Öcalan as the only interlocutor and exclude other 





Kurdish side. The government limited and monitored the interactions between the HDP 
delegation and Öcalan and used this as leverage for negotiations. Second, in the absence of a 
legal framework; the peace talks could not conduct in a systematic and legalized manner. 
There was neither a comprehensive agenda nor a clear timeframe nor mutually agreed ground 
rules. That raised uncertainty about the intentions of the opponent and the credibility of the 
peace process. There was also no monitoring committee while the PKK was withdrawing its 
armed elements to outside Turkey; thereby, the withdrawal process fell into the trap of 
commitment problems. Third, in the absence of a third party that would have increased the 
costs of returning to the battlefield and the benefits of peace, the peace process was susceptible 
to shifts in relative power that affected the choices of both sides. The shift of alliances due to 
regional developments, namely the Syrian civil war and the rise of Islamic State, produced a 
dramatic unintended change in the balance of power in favor of the PKK. The US military 
assistance to the KCK-affiliated groups in Syria and Iraq and the PKK’s growing international 
prestige increased the PKK’s capabilities. Lacking the complete information of the PKK’s 
capabilities in this new context, the peace process was subject to asymmetric information 
problems. While the PKK repeatedly called on a third party, in particular the US, to intervene 
in the peace process, Turkey rejected such intervention. The US, like the other possible 
candidate, the UK, decided to protect their strategic and security priorities with Turkey and 
decided not to heed the calls of the PKK to intervene in the Turkey-PKK peace process. 
Finally, rather than mitigating asymmetric information and commitment problems, these 
bargaining practices intensified them, thereby increasing the likelihood of a return to war. 
This research essay suggests four sets of implications. First, both sides in a peace 





these choices result from ill-designed measures in bargaining practices and/or the lack of third 
party that would redress the relative balance of power and maintain it during the peace talks in 
order to make peace a desired outcome for both sides. This ultimately intensifies the problems 
of credible commitment. Third, disruptive exogenous shifts in relative capabilities, especially 
in favor of the NSAG, may produce asymmetric information problems. Fourth, some conflicts 
do not lend themselves to third-party intervention, as it may be too difficult or too costly for 
third parties to redress the relative balance of power.   
Research Limitations 
Two possible limitations are identified: the limited scope of the case, and the 
consequences for the analysis from the fact that the PKK leader, Öcalan, was in solitary 
confinement. These limitations may impact the ability of the research to effectively answer 
hypotheses as well as the quality of my findings. First, the data for the case study was gathered 
only on the third round of peace talks and how they failed, and does not provide a more robust 
assessment of the Turkey-PKK peace process over all. Although I used qualitative analysis 
and tried to be as systematic as I could, my method cannot be considered a thorough account 
of the Turkey-PKK peace process, because I did not study the entire process but only a small 
part of it and because, the secrecy surrounding the talks, prevented me from conduction 
thorough process-tracing analysis. Thus, the research falls short of expectations as a theory-
grounded case study, due to the lack of comparable or exhaustive data. The results, therefore, 
may be hard to generalize.  
The second limitation relates to the content of the peace process. Öcalan acted as a 
chief negotiator throughout. Yet, he has been in jail in Turkey since his capture in 1999. 





his leadership and his ability to negotiate have been challenged. It is atypical for peace talks to 
have one of their main protagonists in jail; it is also relatively atypical for peace talks not to 
involve directly one of the main armed actors, in this case the PKK’s armed factions. Thus, the 
process lacked transparency and inclusiveness. This created a serious imbalance of power, 
giving the Turkish government more control over the peace process. The negotiating parties 
mistrusted each other and there was even mistrust within each of them. This, in turn, had 
serious repercussions on my ability to gather reliable information and data for the analysis. I 
thus opted to gather information as close as possible to the events without using commentary 
or opinions. To minimize the risk of inaccurate or unreliable information, I crosschecked the 
data, yet I must acknowledge the possibility of bias in my sources. 
Is a fourth round of peace talks possible? 
Following the collapse of the third round of negotiations, in July 2015, armed struggle 
between Turkish security forces and PKK units escalated in southeastern urban centers where 
Turkey declared 62 urban curfews, ranging from several hours to several weeks. Between July 
and December 2015, 194 security officials, over 221 PKK militants, and as many as 151 
civilians have lost their lives. Thousands of residents of Turkey’s Kurdish southeast have been 
displaced (International Crisis Group 2015). Despite its losses in the November 1 elections, 
the HDP has maintained a guaranteed position in the Turkish parliament, but the spillover of 
the Syrian civil war with the advent of the IS against the Kurdish PYD in Syria has created an 
even more hostile environment for the peace process. Turkey has been rocked by a series of 
deadly terrorist attacks in major urban centers – the largest terrorist attacks in its history. 
Though not all attacks have been directly linked to the collapse of the peace talks, there is 





between the PYD and the Islamic State in Syria, and this minimizes the chances of the peace 
process resuming in the near future.  
The outbreak of another crisis has further complicated the possibility of a fourth round. 
Turkey faced a coup attempt on 15 July 2016.179 Unprecedented reconciliation between 
Turkish political factions, namely AKP, CHP, and MHP, following the failed coup attempt did 
nothing but deepen the HDP’s exclusion. Despite their strong condemnation of the coup 
attempt, this exclusion, at a time of perceived national (read Turkish) solidarity, indicates that 
a renewed round of the peace process will not be in the cards in the near future.180 At the time 
of writing, the co-leaders of the HDP party, along with 9 MPs, have been arrested.181 New 
deadly terrorist attacks have hit Turkey’s Kurdish southeast.182  
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